Showing posts with label Porter Model. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Porter Model. Show all posts

Monday, May 12, 2008

Advantages to Controlling Hardware Selection and OS Development

PC Magazine contributor Sascha Segan shares his insight on Microsoft’s recent missteps with Vista and Mobile OS in this month’s edition (June ’08). His primary thesis is that there is a disconnect between Microsoft’s OS and the capabilities of hardware components. Microsoft develops software on the assumption that the hardware installed-base would contain the latest, most powerful processors and graphic cards. This became problematic for MSFT when chip and device makers chose to keep costs down by utilizing lower powered circuitry. In short, Microsoft OS is built for the hardware of tomorrow as opposed to that of today.

Firms such as Apple (AAPL) and Research In Motion (RIMM) control the OS and hardware for their products. In my opinion, this gives them an advantage over Microsoft who must tailor its OS to the hardware of multiple manufacturers.

According to Segan, Intel needed to contain its costs, thus it opted for motherboards that included non-Vista-friendly integrated graphics as opposed to a dedicated chip set. Even though Vista operated poorly integrated graphics designed PCs, Microsoft approved its operability. This hardware-software gap caused significant performance issues for consumers.

Eventually, PCs become more powerful thus performance catches up to the needs of the Microsoft’s OS. In past years, this wasn’t a significant issue. However, today, consumers have a more viable alternative as evidenced with the populatity of Apple’s Macintosh. Consumers may not wait for performance to catch up, rather they may be inclined to purchase a Mac instead.

Segan also claims that MSFT has made the same mistake with Windows Mobile OS. It’s designed for processor speeds not found in the majority of mobile handsets. Segan adds “given a choice of making it faster or making it cheaper, most manufacturers will pick cheaper”

We have seen that Vista has had a rocky introduction, and Microsoft recently announced that a “downgrade” to XP would be available for less powerful machines. Mobile OS has been less than stellar as well, albeit improving. My experience with Mobile OS was horrible. I finally ditched the device after becoming fed up with the “spinning hourglass” popping up when trying to answer a call.

I believe Segan’s article illustrates the advantage Apple obtains from controlling both software and hardware functions. This gives Apple total control over the user experience as well as making it very difficult for competitors to duplicate.

I was dismayed when PALM decided to go with Windows Mobile OS for its Treo handsets. This creates several problems. First, MSFT Mobile OS places constraints on PALM’s innovation of its mobile devices. The user experience is dependant on MSFT not necessarily on PALM. Second, it limits PALM’s ability to differentiate its handsets. There isn’t much difference between PALM devices and others running Windows Mobile OS, given that the hardware is the easiest component to replicate. Even if competitors are able to replicate Apple’s or RIM’s devices, the software is still different and protects from “knock-off” models.

Apple has a distinct advantage; it’s devices run seamlessly. Vista’s troubles may partially be responsible for the surge in adoption of Mac computers. The simplicity of Apple’s iPhone OS may prove to be a huge weapon against Windows Mobile OS devices, especially when the iPhone become more price competitive.

Apple recently agreed to purchase PA Semi, a private boutique microprocessor design company known for robust, low-power designs. The true nature of Apple’s plans for the acquisition is unknown; however, PA Semi would aid in creating chips that are optimal for Apple’s OS. In addition, instead of licensing CPU architecture, Apple's proprietary, in-house chip design differentiates itself from competitors who use "off the shelf" chip architecture. With unique OS and CPUs, both aspects can be designed around each other, optimizing performance.

Apple and RIM will continue to outshine other mobile handset device makers using Windows Mobile OS. Even if Mobile OS drastically improves, these manufacturers lack differentiation and will have to compete on price. This increases pressure to utilize less powerful components, which will affect performance. RIM and Apple select the hardware needed to support the OS and do not have to make sacrifices detrimental to performance. MSFT, on the other hand, must design its OS according to the specs of the available hardware. However, since MSFT doesn’t control which hardware will be actually used by manufacturers, it faces a more challenging task.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

A Look at Apple's iPod Business

Apple Inc, (nasd:AAPL)- This article focuses on Apple’s iPod business. The iPod has contributed significantly to Apple’s growth the past several years. However, iPod unit growth has been slowing, as nothing can grow forever. Apple has made some modifications to its iPod line which should help boost iPod demand. Apple announces Q2 results April 23rd, and unit sales growth as well as iPod ASP will be areas of focus.

Deceleration of iPod's sales growth is pointing to a market approaching saturation. Considering Apple has sold more than 140 million iPods, it’s not inconceivable to think that the PMP market is maturing. The iPod segment was Apple’s primary growth engine for FY05 and FY06 representing 58% of the dollar sales increase both years.

As iPod sales began to cool last year, Mac growth accelerated becoming the primary growth supplier. While investors aren’t expecting the iPod to be the chief source of growth going forward, sales still need to keep rising to not become a drag on Apple’s overall growth.

Apple will have to depend more heavily on the iPod customer base as a source for continued iPod demand. The introduction of the iPod Touch and the Shuffle’s reduced price point should help support iPod growth in the near-term. The Touch boosted iPod average selling price per unit in Q1. If Apple can continue to boost ASP, then the slowdown in unit volume growth will less adversely affect overall revenue.

iPod Sales:
iPods were the primary growth engine for FY05 and FY06, responsible for roughly 58% of Apple’s total revenue growth for both years. In FY07, iPod segment generated only 14% of overall sales growth. As a percentage of total revenue, iPod accounted for 33% (FY05), 40% (FY06), and 35% (FY07).

It’s not a surprise that sales of iPods have been slowing. Since we live in a world of limited resources, growth cannot persist indefinitely. As iPod sales have grown to staggering heights, the Law of Large Numbers takes effect. To continue its FY07 31% unit growth rate, Apple would need to sell close to 70 million iPods in FY08, which is one-half the 140 million total sold over 6 years. At that growth rate, iPod sales would be 200 million FY12. It’s Highly unlikely that annual sales volume would ever achieve that level. Unit growth has been trending towards a rate in the teens, possibly single-digits.

Last quarter, Q1 2008, units increased 5%, compared to 50% growth in Q1 2007. Yr/Yr 2007 growth rates were 24% (Q4), 21% (Q3), and 17% (Q2).

Unit growth was 31% in FY07, compared to 75% (FY06), 409% (FY05), 371% (FY04), and 149% (FY03).

iPod unit sales only grew 5% (y/y) for Q1, but dollar sales increased by 17% due to a higher average selling price (ASP). After 8 consecutive quarters of declining ASP, the Touch reversed that trend as ASP rose last quarter to $181/unit. You would have to go back 6 quarters to find a higher ASP. Boosting the ASP is a very positive sign in light of the slowdown in volume. Going forward, ASP will be the key metric to focus on.






Product Life Cycle:
iPod sales have mirrored the S-curve, which generally depicts the product life cycle. There are 5 stages in the PLC. Initially, sales growth is flat and then begins to increase in the introduction stage. The product enters the rapid growth stage, where sales increase at an accelerating rate. In the slowing growth stage, sales increase at a decreasing rate, finally to a point where sales turn flat as the product enters the maturity phase. Sales growth turns negative in the decline stage.

To avert the Decline (or mature) stage, product innovation is needed to rejuvenate sales growth. Introducing improved models with new features can sprout a new curve from sales growth reaccelerating. The S-curve then takes on a more scalloped shape.

To eliminate the seasonal effects, I have charted cumulative 4-quarter iPod sales. The resemblance to the de-facto S-curve is apparent.

iPod Growth Strategies:
Sales can only come from 3 sources: 1) Non-users of product category 2) Competitors’ customers 3) Firm’s current customers. Saturation occurs when the market can no longer expand from the addition of non-category users. Often, a industry shake-out occurs from firms switching focus from attracting new category users, to stealing competitors users. Weak firms are pushed out of the industry and a competitive equilibrium results. Capturing sales from competitors' users becomes increasingly difficult. A much greater focus is then placed on extracting more sales from current customers. A firm can revolutionize a mature product (making current obsolete) to start a new life cycle.

3 Sources for Increasing Sales:

  1. Non-Users- Don’t use product category: Attract new users

    The number of consumers, who don’t own a PMP but potentially would buy one, is dwindling. If a consumer hasn’t purchased a PMP by now, the likelihood of purchasing one in the future is relatively low. With 140 million iPods sold and likely more than 200 million total PMPs sold, it’s increasingly difficult to keep expanding the market to new users. Yet the market will continue to expand, albeit at a much slower rate.

    In sum, Apple can’t depend on new users to supply the sales volume as in previous years.

    The new Touch has the potential to expand the market since it’s not exclusively a music/video player. For those with little interest in music, then the web browsing, e-mail, and PDA features may be attractive.
  2. Other’s Users- use competitors’ products: Increase market share

    Apple’s iPod has more than 70% of the unit share of the PMP market. That number has held steady for past several years. With such a large share, Apple has already taken business from its competitors, thus less remaining to take now.

    The iPod has roughly 90% of the market’s dollar, thus competing devices are the most part cheaper and target more price sensitive consumers. Apple just recently cut iPod Shuffle prices from $79 to $49 making iPods more competitive among lower-priced devices. I expect Apple may slightly increase its market share, but not to an extent large enough to boost sales growth significantly.
  3. Current Users- iPod owners: influence to buy multiple devices / buy new device more frequently

    iPod owners represent the largest source of potential sales. They outnumber competitors’ users and non-users likely to purchase a PMP in the near-term. Apple’s sales strategy will increasingly focus on selling more iPods to current owners since they represent the largest source of potential sales growth.

    Motivating current customers to buy a new iPod more frequently and/or buy multiple units are the primary methods for boosting sales among current iPod owners.

    PMP devices aren’t similar to printer ink, where more usage leads to more sales. Since usage doesn’t cause product consumption, the replacement cycle is longer. Speeding up the replacement cycle is more difficult than other products whereby it’s advised to “change every 3,000 miles” or “lather, rinse, and repeat” and “best if used by x date.”

    Device enhancements from adding new features and expanded capabilities speed up the replacement cycle. A number of iPod owners buy a new generation model because of better features even when their current device works fine. Innovation is key driver in the replacement cycle for this type of product. New enhancements have to be so compelling to motivate the upgrade.

    There is little need to have more than one PMP device since a user can only listen to one device at a time. Since devices are highly portable, there isn’t a need to buy multiple devices for use at different locations.

    Differentiation of the iPod model line encourages the purchase of multiple iPods. The introduction of the Touch and reduction in size and price of the Shuffle has reduced overlap of features. This may lead to iPod owners purchasing an additional model since the functionality is different.

iPod Product Line:
Primary attributes of iPod models:
Touch- PDA w/ internet & wide screen video
Classic- massive storage
Nano- video w/ size and price
Shuffle- size & price


One of Apple’s key strengths is innovation and the ability to improve its products in short time. This is evidenced by the 5 upgrades to the Classic model since originally introduced in late 2001. There have been 5 generations of the “Mini or Nano” model since 2004. The advances in functionality have been very significant, all one has to do is compare the Touch to an early iPod model.

The iPod took a giant leap with the Touch. The display is much larger than other iPods and includes touch screen navigation. Touch iPods also include WiFi, users can access the web, e-mail, and utilize the widgets to grab updated weather, stock prices, maps, as well as watching YouTube Videos. It also has PDA applications, such as calendar and notes, as do other iPods, but the Touch’s qwerty keyboard significantly enhances functionality.

The evolution of the iPod line creates a higher possibility that an iPod owner would want more than one model. For example: Touch for PDA/internet, Classic as repository to store all content, Nano (or more likely a Shuffle) for carrying a small device (during exercise).

The iPod potential market is expanded by the Touch’s new capabilities, which may attract new consumers who had little interest buying a device strictly for music and video. Current iPod owners may buy a Touch for its PDA and web functionality. When third party applications arrive in June, the Touch will be revolutionized into an entirely new device as it will receive a massive boost in capabilities.

The first iPod models only differed in capacity. In 2004, a smaller model “mini” was added at a significantly lower price point. Being just music players (later video added), consumers would choose an iPod based on desired capacity and price. Most likely, that would be the only model he/she would need/want. The introduction of the Touch changes that scenario with its PDA and web browsing attributes. The Shuffle’s diminutive size, measuring 1 in x 1.5 in and weighing ½ oz, make it ideal for physical activity. Priced at $50, it’s attractive to current and non-current iPod owners.

iPod Outlook:
The Touch presents the opportunity for attracting new PMP users plus influencing current owners to “trade up” to a device at a higher ASP. The Shuffle should appeal to price sensitive consumers who previously weren’t willing to pay the high prices for iPods. These two factors should strengthen demand in light of a maturing market.

Eventually, the iPhone will cannibalize a sizable amount of iPod sales, specifically the Touch. However, since a single carrier in the US offers the iPhone and only available in few foreign markets, the Touch provides most of the iPhone features to consumers who can’t feasibly buy an iPhone. This is especially beneficial for consumers who are locked in a wireless contract with a carrier other than AT&T, or for someone working at a business that doesn’t support iPhone. The Touch lets them become acquainted with a device similar to the iPhone, and when conditions permit, enhances the likelihood that they will purchase an iPhone. I am basing that assumption on the high rates of customer satisfaction.

For the upcoming quarters, Investors should focus on the trend in unit volume in the context of ASP. If unit volume is sluggish, we want to see a high ASP. If ASP is weak, we will want to see very robust unit volume.

Saturday, July 7, 2007

Industry Analysis: Porter's Five Forces Driving Competition

Porter's 5 Forces Model:

I. Threat of Potential Entrants-
Barriers to Entry
1. Economies of Scale
• Refer to declines in unit costs of a product as the absolute volume per period increases.
• Scale economies may be present in many functional areas: manufacturing, purchasing, R&D, marketing, service network, and distribution.
• Its possible to share economies across businesses within a firm if there are shared costs and/or shared benefits such as intangible assets such as brand strength and know-how
• Barriers can occur with economies to vertical integration
• New entrants are faced with huge cost disadvantages if they can not enter in minimum efficient scale
2. Product Differentiation
• Established firms have brand identification and loyalties, which stem from past advertising, customer service, product differentiation, or being the pioneer.
• Entrants are forced to spend heavily to overcome existing customer loyalties
3. Capital Requirements
• If large sums are capital are needed a barrier may exist especially if its risky or unrecoverable, upfront investment such as advertising and R&D.
• Most firms have access to capital, but if risky cost of capital will be high thus giving the advantage to the incumbent firms.
4. Switching Costs
• If switching costs are high, new entrants must provide a substantial inducement for customers to switch from an incumbent.
5. Access to Distribution Channels
• If incumbent firms have channels tied up, new entrant must provide incentives to channel members to accept its product through price breaks and advertising allowances
• New entrants may have to create new channels if the established ones are characterized by strong, symbiotic relationships among the members
6. Cost Disadvantages Independent of Scale
• Established firms may have cost advantages not replicable by potential entrants no matter what their size and attained economies of scale.
1. Proprietary product technology or patents
2. Favorable access to raw materials- established firms may have locked up most favorable sources
3. Favorable locations
4. Government subsidies
5. Learning or experience curve- unit costs decrease as firm gains more cumulative experience in producing a product. Costs decline because workers improve their methods and become more efficient (learning curve), layout improvements, and technology improvements.
7. Government Policy
• Government could limit entry by licensing requirements and limits on access to raw materials.
• Pollution control and product safety requirements
Expected Retaliation-
• Expectations of existing competitors will influence threat of entry
• History of vigorous retaliation
• Established firms with resources to fight back, including excess cash and borrowing capacity, exceed productive capacity, or great leverage with distribution channels or customers
• Established firms with great commitment to the industry and highly illiquid assets
• Slow industry growth: limits industry’s ability to absorb a new firm
Entry Deterring Price-
• Entry deterring price is the prevailing structure of prices which balances the potential rewards from entry with expected costs of overcoming structural entry barriers and risking retaliation
Properties of Entry Barriers
• Entry barriers can and do change as conditions change
• Firms’ strategic decisions affect entry barriers such as increasing advertising or establishing a distribution network or vertical integration; all can increase economies of scale thus barriers to entry


II. Intensity in Rivalry of Existing Competitors
1. Numerous or Equally Balanced Competitors
• With numerous competitors- increased risk of maverick firms who might think they won’t be noticed
• If few, equal competitors - may be prone to fight each other and if have similar resources, they probably have similar strategies thus same target market
2. Slow Industry Growth
• Slow growth turns competition into a market share game for firms seeking growth..
3. High Fixed or Storage Costs
• High fixed costs create strong pressures for firms to fill capacity which leads to price cutting when excess capacity is present
4. Lack of Differentiation or Switching Costs
• If offerings are perceived as commodity or near commodity, then competition is based on price and service, resulting in intense price competition
5. Capacity Added in Large Increments
• Risks of overcapacity thus periods of price-cutting to fill capacity
6. Diverse Competitors
• Competitors may have a hard time reading each other’s intentions accurately and agreeing on the rules of the game
7. High Strategic States
• Firm may have increased pressure to succeed in a particular industry in order to further its overall corporate strategy.
8. High Exit Barriers
• Exit barriers are economic, strategic, and emotional factors that keep firms from leaving poor industries
i. Specialized assets with low liquidation values
ii. Fixed costs of exit: labor agreements, resettlement costs
iii. Strategic Interrelationships: Image, shared costs
iv. Emotional barriers: loyalty to stakeholders, pride, fear
v. Government and social restrictions: govt. denial or discouragement for exit


III. Pressure from Substitute Products
• Substitutes perform the same function as the products in the industry, satisfy same needs and wants
• Substitutes that merit attention are ones improving their price performance trade-off and highly profitable products
• Substitutes limit returns by placing ceiling on prices


IV. Bargaining Power of Buyers
1. Purchases Large Volumes Relative to Seller Sales
• Raises importance of buyer’s business in firms performance
2. Products Represent Significant Fraction of Buyers Costs or Purchases
• Buyers are price sensitive and will search for best deals
3. The Products are Undifferentiated or Standard
• If buyers can find alternatives may play one supplier against another
4. Buyers Face Few Switching Costs
5. Buyer can Influence Purchase Decision of Consumers
• Retail has power over manufacturers when they can influence purchasing decisions- such as products that require sales assistance like appliances
6. Buyers Earn Low Profits
• Creates great incentives for buyers lower purchasing costs and find or bargain for best deal
7. Buyers Pose Threat of Backward Integration
• If pose threat, buyers are in a position to demand concessions
8. Quality Unimportant to Quality of Buyer’s Product or Services
• If quality is important then buyers are less price sensitive
9. Buyers Have Full Information
• If buyers have full info about demand, actual market prices, and even supplier costs, this provides greater bargaining leverage then when information is poor


V. Bargaining Power of Suppliers
1. Dominated by Few Sellers and More Concentrated than Industry it Sells to -
• Suppliers selling to more fragmented buyers will have more influence in prices, quality, terms
2. Suppliers Do Not Face Threat of Substitutes
• Power of large, powerful suppliers can be checked if they compete with substitutes.
3. The Industry is not Important Customer of Supplier Group
• If suppliers sell to many industries, and a particular industry does not represent a significant fraction of sales, suppliers can exert power
• If industry is important customer, suppliers fortunes will be tied to the industry, therefore they will want to protect it with reasonable pricing and assistance in activities like R&D and Lobbying
4. Suppliers Group Products are Differentiated/ Switching Costs involved
• Buyers facing switching costs or differentiation does not allow them to play suppliers against one another
• High switching costs can place firms at the mercy of their suppliers
5. Suppliers Product is Important Input to Buyer’s Business
• If input is important to manufacturing process or product quality then supplier power is increased.
6. Threat of Forward Integration
• This provides a check for firms to improve their purchasing terms
• Labor must be considered as a supplier. Unions and scarce, highly skilled labor can bargain away potential profits
Memphis, TN, United States