Apple Inc (AAPL): Current Valuation Still Reasonable

Apple Inc. (nasd:AAPL) $162.83- Despite Apple shares rising more than 100% from its 2009 low of $78, the stock still appears to be attractively valued especially as a long-term holding. Using cash-flow and non-GAAP earnings, AAPL trades at less than 15x on a trailing 12-month basis. Since sales and cash flows were likely significantly depressed over that time period due to the sharp economic contraction, demand should improve considerably in the quarters ahead. Thus, forward multiples would be even lower given the anticipated rebound in sales and earnings growth.

The modest price multiple at which AAPL currently trades leads me to conclude that investors are: 1) Attributing the slowdown in Mac and iPod segments to a permanent secular decline, rather than temporary weakness consistent with economic contractions. 2) Ignoring/underappreciating the growth potential of the iPhone and products yet to be introduced.

Non-GAAP Earnings & Cash Flow:

Apple has reported $5.72 GAAP EPS for the past 4 quarters combined (ttm). However, over the same period, Apple has earned $9.23 in non-GAAP EPS (ttm). The non-GAAP figures are a better representation of Apple's earnings power since iPhone revenues are recognized in the period sold and not deferred over a 24 month time frame as is the case with GAAP EPS. The GAAP EPS numbers grossly understate Apple's profitability and cash-flow generation.

Looking at the difference between GAAP revenue and non-GAAP revenue for the past 4 quarters, GAAP revenue would be $7.7B higher, or 22.3% if Apple were not required to account for iPhone sales using the subscription method. Reported EPS (ttm) would have been $3.51, or 61.4% higher as well. The most noticeable difference is the effect iPhone sales have on profit margins. Since the iPhone carries the highest margin for Apple hardware, there is a dramatic impact on gross and net margins when subscription accounting is reversed. Gross margin rises from 35.5% to 39.6%, and net margin increases from 15.0% to 19.7%.

GAAP Revenue (ttm) has increased 12.2% compared to the prior trailing 4 quarters, yet non-GAAP sales increased 29.7%, more than double the rate of GAAP revenue growth. GAAP earnings growth (ttm) versus the prior 4 quarters was 11.7% ($5.72 vs. $5.12). However, non-GAAP EPS (ttm) increased 66.3% ($9.23 vs $5.55) compared to the same period for the prior year.

From June 2008 to June 2009, Apple's cash holdings increased $10.35B, from $20.77B to $31.12B. On a per share basis, cash/share increased $11.38, or 50% from $22.85/share (June 2008) to $34.24/share (June 2009). Apple generated $10.26B in free cash flow over the last 4 quarters, or $11.28/share.

It is clearly evident that the reported GAAP figures widely understates Apple's true performance. Therefore, investors should focus on the non-GAAP numbers and cash flow when evaluating Apple.

Valuation Metrics:

Even though stock values reflect future cash flows, we can examine Apple's performance over the last 4 quarters (ttm) to use as a conservative proxy since the recessionary backdrop has most likely depressed revenue and earnings. Apple's GAAP EPS (ttm) of $5.72 translates into a historical P/E (ttm) of 28.5x. That would appear to be quire a rich valuation, especially given the multiple compression that has occurred in the overall equity market. Or, at least, imply significant future growth.

However, investors should know that evaluating AAPL based on GAAP accounting is completely flawed. To compare apples to apples, investors must gauge Apple using its non-GAAP figures relative to peers/market. Apple uses subscription accounting methods to account for iPhone sales which spreads handset revenues over 24 months by accruing unrecognized revenue in a deferred revenue account that is stated on its balance sheet. Apple's non-GAAP EPS (ttm) is $9.23 which equates to a trailing P/E of 17.6x. That is a stark difference than the misleading GAAP P/E of 28.5x.

Considering that Apple has $34.24/share in cash & securities that could theoretically distributed to shareholders, Apple trades at even a lower multiple based on non-GAAP EPS ex cash. If we strip out $34.24 cash/share from AAPL's $162.83 share price, we are left with $128.59/share which essentially reflects the value of Apple's operating assets. In addition, interest income must be stripped out of earnings before calculating a P/E multiple due to the assumption that the cash stockpile would be distributed, hence no longer contributing interest income to EPS. For the trailing 4 quarters, Apple earned 33 cents per share (after-tax) in interest income. Apple is trading 14.4x ex-cash (ttm) based non-GAAP EPS ex-interest income of $8.90.

When there is a large disparity between interest yield (interest income/cash) and earnings yield (EPS/Price or 1/PE), the large cash balances can skew the value of the (non-cash) operating assets. When short-term rates were over 5% (pre-tax) and Apple traded at 20+ multiple, the earnings yield was roughly equivalent to the cash yield. Therefore, there was little or no difference between the standard P/E and P/E ex-cash & interest. Now that current short-term rates are near zero, Apple's cash holdings contribute very little income to total company earnings.

If Apple used its $31.1B for a stock buyback, it could reduce share count by 191M to 718M. Non-GAAP EPS (adjusted for interest income) would rise to $11.21 translating into a P/E (ttm) of 14.5x.

In the past year, Apple's cash position has increased by $10.35B or $11.38/share giving a P/CF (ttm) of 14.3x. Trailing free cash flow was slightly less at $10.26B giving a P/FCF (ttm) multiple of 14.4x. Removing the value of cash and interest income (from share price & FCF), the P/FCF multiple drops to 11.7x.

Recall that this valuation exercise has been based on historical earnings, not expected future earnings which is more appropriate since investors only care about future cash flows. However, I used trailing earnings since those figures are known while future earnings are not. I am confident that Apple's next 4 quarters will be better than its previous four. The economy has been in a deep recession for the past year, but has begun to improve. Apple has managed to withstand the downtown reasonably well; and with the success of the iPhone/App Store along with the possibility of new products, Apples growth should accelerate moving forward. Thus, I am reasonably confident that Apple's valuation multiples are even lower on a prospective basis.

Price Implied Expectations:

Trading for less 15x trailing earnings and ~12x expected earnings, AAPL on the surface appears cheap. Historically AAPL has traded at much higher valuations, yet expected growth was much higher too. In addition, investors are demanding a higher required rate of return on equities by paying lower price multiples. The increase in equity risk premium inherent in all stocks has led to the decline in P/E ratios. Investors perceive greater risks and are less sanguine about the long-run prospects of equity returns. This accounts for a portion of Apple's low valuation relative to its historical premium.

The primary reason why the investors are assigning a paltry price multiple is due to expected declines in Apple's growth rate. In my opinion, the current share price reflects the expectation of Mac growth commensurate with the industry average, declining iPod growth, and iPhone growth that will peak and rapidly decline to the industry average in a couple years. In short, Apple is priced as if its growth is quickly maturing, such as MSFT or DELL who both saw their margins compress as growth stalled. All firms eventually fall victim to the industry/firm life cycle. However, is this expectation likely for Apple's future? That is the key question.

I don't believe that overly optimistic or unrealistic expectations are priced-in AAPL shares. I believe the current outlook implied by the share price is conservative, but not entirely unlikely. The future of Apple's growth hinges on innovation and new products/services, as it does for most firms. Many firms are unsuccessful at being able to continue to innovate, staying relevant and avoiding being commoditized. In short, Apple's share price doesn't give much value to its ability to innovate and reignite growth. In my opinion, it's the belief whether or not Apple can continue to introduce products that wow consumers that determines if AAPL is over/under valued.

Apple's Record of Successful Innovation and Execution:

1) iPod's Dominant Market Share-

Apple's unit market share has exceeded 70% in the U.S. for years as it has successfully continued to ward off competition leaving carcasses by the wayside. Many powerful companies such as Dell, Sony, and Microsoft have attempted dethrone the iPod only to fall short or outright fail. Apple has been able to keep iPod prices relatively high as its revenue share of the U.S. PMP market is higher than 90%.

2) Apple's iTunes store is largest music retailer-

Tunes surpassed Best Buy and Wal-Mart to take the top spot is sales volume. Apple should increase its lead as bricks and mortar stores cutback on music selection due to high inventory cost and required floor space. Demand for physical music continues to decline as consumers shift to buying digital music online. Competitors have followed with online music download stores, yet they have made little dent in iTunes market share.

3) Retail stores generate highest revenue/sq.ft. and foot traffic-

It's quite indisputable that any retail strategy has been as successful as Apple's retail stores. Apple leads in performance metrics such as revenue/sq.ft. and visitors/store etc, but its retail strategy also has been extremely successful in promoting its brand and introducing customers to its products. Other computer makers' retail efforts have failed, such as Gateway and Dell. Many third-party computer and electronics resellers have also disappeared, such as CompUSA and Circuit City. It's quite evident that it's a very challenging environment to navigate. Apple continues to open new stores and is expanding considerably abroad.

4) Turn-around of Mac business and domination of premium segment:

Mac unit sales increased 38% in FY08 and 40% in FY07, which was more than 3x the PC industry as a whole outpacing the industry in 18 of the last 19 quarters. Even though Mac unit growth has slowed to single-digits, its share of the premium price segment has exploded. According to NPD, Macs made up 91% of sales for PCs priced $1000 and above for June 2009, up from 88% in May. This compares to 66% share Mac had in Early 2008. I believe Apple had about 40% share of the premium market in 2007. It is quite evident that Apple is the only PC manufacturer than can command a premium for its products.

5) Large and increasing share of smartphone market-

Even with the experience and industry footing incumbent mobile handset makers possessed, Apple was able to enter the market and quickly gain share. According to several surveys, the iPhone has the highest satisfaction rates by a considerable margin. Industry competition is very intense, yet Apple is the one to catch in the smartphone segment.

6) iTunes App Store-

One year after launching, the iTunes App Store offers 65K applications and has seen over 1.5B downloads. Other firms have followed with their own mobile app stores, yet haven't been able to duplicate nearly as much developer and consumer interest. Nintendo mentioned last quarter that Apple's App Store is impacting its handheld gaming business.

These remarkable achievements illustrate a common theme. Apple has been able to enter new product markets and become the leader that others must chase. Even though many competitors have attempted to duplicate Apple's strategy, most have had hardly much success, at least in terms of stealing business from Apple. A popular concern among Apple investors is that increasing competition from the number of firms following in Apple's footsteps. They believe that others will eventually catch Apple (iPhone, App Store, iTunes Music),hence its lead is only temporary. However, this has been a concern for ages and yet to come to fruition. That is not to say it won't happen as there is a real possibility that it will eventually. But given Apple's proven track record of disrupting, dominating, and defending its new endeavors, it's likely Apple will remain the innovative leader for sometime.

Apple's share price may reflect declining iPod growth and decelerating Mac growth, but it doesn't reflect potential new products which are a certainty. The success of those new products are less certain, but Apple makes products/services that complementary to its others, rather natural extensions. Basically, Apple products help drive sales of other products as well as increasing switching costs creating customer "lock-in."

Apple's products elicit the some of the highest customer satisfaction scores for their respective categories which has created immense loyalty and a powerful brand.

Conclusion:

On a non-GAAP basis ex-cash, Apple is trading at less than 15x trailing EPS. Considering the economy has been going through the worst economic downtown since the Great Depression, Apple's trailing earnings are depressed. As the economy turns up, earnings will normalize at a higher level. In addition, iPhone sales should continue to exhibit strong growth and drive free cash flow. Therefore, investors should be highly confident that future earnings will be considerably higher. On a forward earnings basis, AAPL's price multiple is 10-12x, a valuation representative of maturing growth. However, Apple has a long track record of innovation and using products to promote and attract consumers to its other offerings. Looking at the many remarkable achievements by Apple any the many stumbles by competitors, it can be argued that AAPL deserves a premium multiple, not a multiple reflective of ordinary growth.

Disclosure: Long AAPL

Apple Inc (AAPL): iPhone's Substantial Impact on Gross Margin

Margins held steady Q/Q at 36.3% (down 10 bps) versus expectation of ~200 bps of margin contraction due to mounting headwinds.

Management issued Q4 GM guidance of 34%, 100 bps higher than Q3 33% GM guidance (which AAPL exceeded by 330 bps).

Considering the number of challenging cost environment Apple's Q3 performance and Q4 GM guidance are huge positives.

(1) Apple was able to maintain gross margins for Q3 and (2) According to Apple's guidance, I expect GM to hold in Q4.

The past two quarters have seen a significant lift in gross margins compared to the 3 periods prior (3Q08-1Q09) in which GM held steady at 34.7%. The rise in GM has be a major factor in the near doubling of the stock price since the January low. In the 2nd half of FY08, management started a chorus that it expects 30% GM for FY09. Even when GM turned out to be healthy for Q1 & Q2, Apple maintained its 30% GM outlook. This had many analysts and investors worried.

Last October, I reported Apple's FY09 Gross Margin Expectations Too Low arguing that GM will for FY09 will come in way above the 30% guidance. In January, I wrote Apple's FY09 EPS Estimate Too Low stating that the forecasted decline in FY09 EPS by analysts wasn't not going to happen and that earnings should increase by at least 5-10% versus FY08. (For the 3 quarters already reported for FY09, EPS is up ~8% versus the same 3 quarters for FY08.) The main thesis was gross margins would come in significantly above expectations mostly due to high margin iPhone revenue becoming a larger share of total sales.

1) Mitigated numerous factors pressuring margins.

- Transitioned entire notebook line.

- Cut prices across entire notebook line and/or added increased performance.

- Back to School promotion (Mac discounts plus free 8GB iPod touch).

- Revenue mix shifted towards lower margin Macs from weak business spending affecting the Mac Pro line.

- Component prices increased, coupled with higher commodity and energy prices.

Apple repositioned its entire notebook line, cutting prices significantly on Macbook air, and on 15" and 17" inch Macbook Pros. Apple also introduced 13" Macbook pros in place of the older aluminum body Macbooks. Macbook prices were cut anywhere from $100-$300. In addition, Apple kicked off its "Back to School" program that offers discounts on Macs plus a free iPod touch valued at $229. As a result, coupled with weak business spending, revenue was skewed towards the lower-margin models.

2) Guidance of 34% translates into GM likely coming in the 36%-38% range.

- Past 4 quarters GM has exceeded guidance by an average of 370 basis points.

- GM guidance has increased sequentially 3 quarters in a row. (2Q-32.5%, 3Q-33%, 4Q-34%)

Apple has routinely sandbagged on GM guidance by and average of 350 bps over the past 11 periods, and 370 bps for the last 4 quarters. In addition, over the past 10 quarters, when Apple has raised guidance sequentially, GM either rose or remained flat sequentially except for one instance. The scatter plot of change in guidance on x-axis versus change in actual GM on y-axis demonstrates managements accuracy in forecasting GM at least with respect to direction. Therefore, we can expect GM will up or at least flat in Q4 even in light of the challenging headwinds.

iPhone Contribution:

The profitability of the iPhone has played, and will pay a major roll in Apple's overall gross margins. Since Apple refuses to comment about product level margins, the iPhone's significance is often missed. Apple neglects to mention the iPhone angle due to the fact it doesn't want to discuss product level gross margins. The reasons for doing so are vast: firms desire to "cry poor" for the more money they rake in, the more money others will want to get a piece of. This extends to customers, carriers, suppliers, and competitors. Apple repeatedly exclaims it doesn't want to create an "umbrella" that would attract competitors to enter and undercut it. Therefore, much of the GM upside has been due to iPhone revenue being and increased percentage of total revenue, and since iPhone revenue is deferred, this trend will continue to intensify. I have been writing about this effect for nearly a year.

According to my Apple model, (which is i consider accurate being that its EPS variance has been 4 cents, 2 cents, 1 cent, and ZERO for the past 4 quarters) iPhone contributes an equal amount to EPS as does the Mac segment, and will surpass Mac's EPS contribution in the quarters going forward.

In Apple's 10-Q filings, it breaks out deferred revenue and deferred costs for iPhone and AppleTV reported on the balance sheet. Since AppleTV is a minute sliver of deferred revenue it is assumed that its impact on total deferred revenue (AppleTV + iPhone) is immaterial.

Looking at 4Q07, GM of deferred revenue (1- (deferred costs/deferred revenue)) is 27.5%. It was low since Apple received monthly revenue payments in place of an upfront subsidy as is the case today. 4Q08 comprised of the first quarter of subsidized 3G handsets, thus the bump in GM on the DR/DC on the balance sheet. Notice the non-current GM of 51.9% is 6.5% higher than the 45.3% GM of the current. This results from the non-current bucket comprising of a larger mix of 3G iPhones since much of the legacy (2.5G) iPhones have migrated to the current bucket.

Examining the trend, we can see that GM in the current bucket improves dramatically, at a much faster pace than the non-current bucket. This is due to the mix of new iPhones becoming a larger overall mix in the current bucket, whereas the non-current bucket is already majority of newer iPhone sales. The overall result is than GM are approaching near 60%, which I estimate iPhone GM is currently. This is evidenced by the rising GM Q/Q, especially in the non-current bucket which is impacted more by current sales.

My bottom-up iPhone gross margin estimate is 58.4% for the assumed mix, with the iPhone 3GS 32GB garnering the highest GM and the iPhone 3GS 16GB carrying the lowest of the 3 models.

The Bottom Line:

Deferred revenue as stated on the balance sheet has been increasing substantially. The gross margin attached to this deferred revenue has also increased significantly. Thus, going forward Apple will recognize higher iPhone revenue carrying a higher gross margin. As iPhone revenue as a percentage or share of total revenue increases, the impact of the higher iPhone GM on overall GM will intensify. This will assuage margin pressures Apple faces in other areas.

I wrote last year that the iPhone would cause Apple's overall GM to skyrocket, but I also posited another possibility. Apple would use iPhone GM to subsidize price cuts on other products to stimulate demand and ultimately avoiding an adverse impact on overall GM associated with such price reductions. As we just witnessed, Apple cut prices on its Mac line-up, and there hasn't appeared to be any noticeable impact on overall GM. Going forward, Apple is guiding Q4 GM to 34%, suggesting GM in the 36%-38% range, thus there doesn't appear that these price reductions will have a dramatic impact on its overall GM.

Apple's FY09 EPS Estimate Too Low

Apple Inc (nasd: AAPL)- Apple’s FY09 EPS estimate continues to be revised downward and now stands at a $5.08, a level Apple should easily exceed. The consensus FY09 estimate represents a 5.2% decline from FY08 $5.36 EPS, although revenues are forecasted to increase 11.8%, or $3.8B to $36.3B. Thus, analysts are expecting significant margin compression. Specifically, the consensus estimates for EPS and revenue imply net margin will be 12.8% in FY09, a decline of 2.1% from 14.9% recorded in FY08.

It’s not that I don’t believe the recession will take a major toll on Apple, it will. Instead of achieving 35%-40% earnings growth likely to occur in a normal economy, Apple’s EPS should increase at least 5%-10% in FY09. Due to deferred revenue recognition and upward margin pressure, it’s very unlikely Apple’s earnings will decline, certainly not to the 20%-30% magnitude some analysts predict.

I believe there are two major factors being ignored with respect to FY09 estimates that suggest higher earnings. First, there are multiple factors in play that argue against margin deterioration. This includes lower product and overhead costs, and a more favorable sales mix towards high margin products. iPod revenue (as percentage of total sales) will be much lower in FY09 which is significant since iPod has the lowest margins. iPhone and software have the highest margins and will contribute a much larger portion of Apple’s total revenue.

Second, Apple will recognize a sizable amount of deferred revenue associated with high margin segments, such as iPhone and AppleCare. Also, Apple’s $25B cash position will produce a decent amount of income. Thus, without even having to make a single sale, Apple should still produce $2.67/share in incremental after-tax income.

Assuming 19M iPhone unit sales, incremental taxed EPS for iPhone segment would be $2.99/share. Combining deferred revenue, interest income, and iPhone sales; I estimate incremental EPS will be $4.04. Apple would only have to earn $1.04/share in its other segments to meet the FY09 consensus.





According to Yahoo Finance, the lowest estimate for FY09 is $3.70 (High- $6.00). I have been seeing many estimates being revised down to the mid-to-low $4 range. In my opinion, these estimates are ridiculously low. Canaccord Adams puts FY09 EPS @ $3.70 (31% decline) with an $80 price target and Morgan Stanley’s FY09 estimate is $4.37 (18.5% decline) with price target of $95.

PROFIT MARGIN OUTLOOK:
I recently did a detailed analysis of Apple’s profit margin outlook and concluded that FY09 gross margin expectations are too low. I highlight some of my main points below.

-Favorable Cost Environment:
All of the factors listed below should lead to lower costs, hence higher margins. At the least, provide margin stability by eliminating upward pressure on costs. Considering most of FY08 was marked by a commodity bubble and $100-plus crude, FY09 should be a much more favorable cost environment.

1) Raw Material / Component Prices
2) Energy- Transportation / Overhead
3) Occupancy / Labor (stable)
4) Marketing
5) Scale Benefits & Shared Costs

-Margin Expansion From Increased iPhone Revenue:
The primary driver for higher margins for FY09 is iPhone revenue. The iPhone generates substantially higher margins than the Mac and iPod segments. Due to the subscription accounting whereby iPhone sales are recognized over 8 quarters, the margin effects were minor for FY08 since only $1.84 Billion of iPhone revenue was recognized. This equates to roughly 5.7% of Apple’s total FY08 revenue.

Most analysts and myself included, expect iPhone revenue to come in above $7B for FY09. Not only will the iPhone supply more than 20% of Apple’s total sales (FY09), the subsidy payment agreement of the new 3G model translates into even higher margins compared to the legacy iPhone. I calculated that the gross margin of the new 3G model was 55% in 4Q08.

If Apple recognized iPhone revenue in the period sold, instead of deferring, 4Q08 gross margin would have been 39% compared to GAAP 34.7%, net margin would have been 20.9% vs. 14.4%, and EPS $2.69 vs. $1.26. As deferred revenue continues to pile up on the balance sheet, the portion recognized in current quarterly revenue will continue to increase each quarter.

-Other Margin Drivers:
There are several other factors that could aid profitability this year. First, software revenue, which has huge margins, will be much higher in FY09. Apple is releasing new iWork and iLife editions, and it’s expected to release Mac OSX 10.6 “Snow Leopard” this year. MobileMe also carries high margins, yet even though revenue won’t be much, the yr/yr incremental will be sizable. Second, Apple will incur and recognize more of its high margin AppleCare revenue.

Looking at operational expenses, such as SG&A and R&D, these items should fall on a percentage basis (of total sales) due to leverage effects if sales continue to increase as expected. Looking at the table one can see the trend in declining operating expense and rising profit margins.



The other side of the margin equation is selling price. Margin compression can still occur even while costs are decreasing if selling prices drop more. Apple’s brand is unique and it products command premium prices. Apple’s products are highly differentiated which eliminates price competition. I don’t expect Apple to make drastic price reductions. I recently explained why Macs sell at premium ASPs.

SALES OUTLOOK:
The Street is expecting sales to increase 11.8%, or $3.8B to $36.3B (FY09) vs. $32.5B (FY08). By default, Apple’s sales will increase $3.5B from recognizing 4.85B in current deferred revenue. Apple will also take in around $400 million from iPhone carrier payments and $650 million in investment income. Thus, even with out making a single sale in FY09, Apple will still post nearly $6B in revenue.

Total FY09 iPhone revenue will likely increase by at least $5B, implying Apple’s other revenue is expected to decline if consensus sales growth is $4B. Most analysts expect iPod revenue to drop significantly, coupled with either a slight increase/decrease in Mac sales. I see iPod unit sales declining 25%-30%, but iPod revenue only dropping 15%-20% due to the shift towards the higher ASP touch model.

-iPhone:
According to my estimates, Apple will report iPhone FY09 sales of $7.0B, $3.1B originating from new sales, and 3.9B from recognition of deferred revenue and carrier payments. This assumes Apple sells 19M units. With 56% gross margins, iPhone will contribute $2.99 in EPS. Hence, all other segments only need to earn $2.09/shr to meet the Street’s estimate.

I estimate only 60 cents of $5.36 FY08 EPS is associated with iPhone, which leaves $4.76 from all other segments. This means FY09 non-iPhone EPS could decline 55% or $2.67 to $2.09 and match the $5.08 consensus if iPhone can pull in $2.99/share.

-Mac:
With new MacBooks released in Q1, and new desktops expected in Q2/Q3, FY09 Mac sales should continue to grow despite the weak economy. MacBook hasn’t seen a redesign since being released in 2006. This has provided little reason to replace/upgrade. Looking at unit sales growth, it is evident that the product line had become very tired and in need of a refresh as growth began to lag desktops. There are probably 5M MacBooks that may be replaced in the coming year.

Mac revenue has grown roughly 40% for the past two years, and under favorable economic conditions, I would expect growth to continue if not exceed that pace. Given the harsh economic conditions, I expect single-digit unit growth for FY09.

-Pod:
Unit sales will probably see a sharp decline in FY09 due to the economic landscape and product saturation. The iPod touch model will be popular causing unit sales to exceed forecasts. In addition, the touch will boost ASPs, which will soften the decline in dollar sales.

-Music & Software/Services:
Music segment revenue increased 34% to $3.34B in FY08. Music sales will continue to demonstrate strong growth due to the direct placement of the iTunes music store on the iPhone and iPod touch allowing purchases/downloads in seconds over cellular and Wi-Fi network connections. The iTunes App store could add up to one billion in additional sales this year.

Software sales could get a billion dollar boost from iWork ’09, iLife ’09, Snow Leopard, and MobileMe plus other titles. Typically software delivers high profit margins, thus these software introductions should offer margin support.

CONCLUSION:
When considering the amount of high margin deferred revenue and interest income Apple will recognize this year coupled with multiple drivers lending margin support, it’s unlikely Apple’s earnings will fall in FY09. Apple won’t earn $7 to $8 in EPS possible in a favorable economic climate, but EPS won’t decline as analysts predict.

Apple already has $2.67 in incremental EPS in the bag. Including my estimates for new iPhone sales, the incremental EPS effect is $4.04. Considering SG&A and R&D expense, I estimate that EPS from deferred revenue recognition, interest income, and iPhone sales will be $3.43. Adding Mac, iPod, and all other segments, EPS will easily top the $5.08 concensus.

Disclosure: Long AAPL

Apple Inc (AAPL): Taking a Look at Mac Pricing

MAC DEMAND CONCERNS:
For past couple months, Wall Street’s concern du-jour for Apple has been Mac demand. No PC/consumer electronics firm is immune to this economic downturn, but many analysts believe there is substantial downside risk for Mac sales. Analysts claim the contracting economy is causing changes to the complexion of industry demand that could have further negative implications for the Mac segment. Specifically, the slowdown in consumer spending will cause industry demand to contract, and within the computer industry, demand will shift away from Mac to lower-priced PCs. This double-blow presents a considerable threat that Mac sales will come in way below expectations. Some argue the popularity of netbooks and other low-price PCs present a major challenge for Apple since Macs’ price points encompass the high-end of the spectrum. Thus, Apple lacks a low-price offering within the price range where demand has been and will continue to be strong.

Given the pullback in spending and the shift to lower-priced PCs, analysts have been calling for Apple to introduce a cheaper Mac to become more competitive. Many were expecting just that when Apple unveiled its new MacBooks last October. Missing from the event were price reductions. The legacy white plastic, low-end MacBook received a $100 price cut ($1099 $999), but the mid-range model’s price ($1299) was unchanged, and the high-end MacBook price increased $100 ($1499 -> $1599). This was a disappointment for those who were expecting price cuts of $200-$300, at minimum.

There was ample speculation for Apple’s Black Friday discounts. Most analysts/journalists were predicting larger than usual discounts, 15% compared with Apple’s typical discounts of 5%-10% from previous years. However, Apple offered modest discounts that were inline with its previous Black Friday promotions. Some were disappointed, notably Shaw Wu of Kaufman Brothers: “We would have hoped that with its nearly $25 billion net cash position and very favorable component pricing environment, that Apple would have taken slightly more aggressive action on pricing given that consumers are still hurting from the tough credit environment.” Ben Reitzes of Barclay’s Capital says “like to see Apple get more aggressive in terms of pricing.” The crux of the matter is that if Apple believed steeper discounts would significantly lift demand then it would have cut prices more aggressively.

Aside from the Mac Mini and legacy plastic MacBook (October price reduced to $999), Apple doesn’t offer a sub-$1,000 model. In September, Kathyrn Huberty at Morgan Stanley cut her price target on Apple citing slowing global PC sales. The next Monday, Huberty cuts her rating on Apple, and slashes her price target to $115 from $178 based on the concern that “PC unit growth is decelerating and the remaining source of growth is increasingly in the sub-$1000 market where Apple does not play.”

According to NPD, Apple had 66% market share for the above $1000 price category, and 14% overall. In an August 2008 NPD study, Apple’s market share for the past 12 months in the above $1500 price segment was 69%, up from 41% in the August 2007 survey.

Huberty points out that revenue for the premium segment has been declining (y/y) every month since the winter, and that the sub-$1K market’s revenue has been growing. She concludes that consumer demand is shifting to the low-end, where Apple does not have a presence. In addition, Huberty claims Apple is at risk because it’s highly exposed to the premium-end, where demand has been falling. However, Mac unit sales grew nearly 40% for 2008, and its share in the premium segment almost doubled. Mac sales have been growing roughly 3x the market.

Therefore, it’s Windows PC demand that is shifting to the lower-end.

If the overall industry is trending to lower price points, how does Huberty reconcile the sub-trend of increasing Mac demand, which is mostly confined to the premium segment? If Mac demand runs counter to the premium segment’s overall trend, one can’t make the assertion that there’s a strong correlation. There is a convincing relationship between ASP and growth for the industry, but not for Macs. The PC industry is comprised almost entirely of Windows PCs, thus demand for Windows machines determines industry demand. In short, Macs and Windows PCs are not similar product offerings. Some analysts, notably Huberty, appear to conflate the two. Macs are Windows machines, for one can install Windows OS on Mac hardware and use it just as if it were a Dell or HP. But, PCs such as Dell and HP can’t run Mac OS.

MAC VS WINDOWS HARDWARE:
The reason why demand has shifted towards cheaper PCs is because of substitution. A $1500 Windows PC may not be noticeably different from an $800 machine for most users. With economic fears engulfing the consumer, a less expensive PC still can do everything that a higher-end PC does, albeit with less performance. However, many consumers are not heavy users where such a difference would be detected. Even so, for most users, less performance can be tolerated. Therefore, the question is “What more do I get from spending more? What I am sacrificing by spending less?” For many, the answer is “nothing.” In short, there isn’t much difference. The consumer isn’t going to pay more if he/she doesn’t have to, especially in a tough economy.

Windows machines increasingly compete on price, and price alone. PCs have become commodities; there is little, if any differentiation among hardware manufacturers, especially desktops. Essentially, the sole proprietary aspect of a Windows machine is the brand name; most of the hardware components are sourced from 3rd party manufacturers. Whether it’s Dell, Gateway, HP, or Sony hardware makes little-to-no difference.

I understand why consumers aren’t paying-up for Windows PCs. How are HP, Dell, Acer, Toshiba, etc different from each other if they all use Intel chips, run Windows, and have many other of the same components? Consumers don’t see the value in paying a higher price for a Windows PC versus another. For a significant portion of consumers the main purpose of owning a computer is internet/email access, as well as ability to create documents. Any computer accommodates those needs, thus for many, price is the most relevant attribute. I believe this is the driving force behind netbook popularity. Many consumers desire a computer capable of performing basic tasks, such as email, internet, etc. Netbook CPUs are low-powered, and are not suitable for heavier usage, such as graphic intense games or spreadsheets containing complex formulas.

Consumers perceive less differentiation among Windows hardware, thus they are more likely to select whichever brand offers the best price for the desired configuration. Consumers are not necessarily shifting to cheaper PCs solely based on price. Consumers trade down because there isn’t sufficient value-added to justify paying a higher price.

Conversely, there is a stark difference between spending less for a Windows PC (or any amount) opposed to buying the higher-priced Mac. Mac OS X and the associated user experience are significantly different from Windows. Hardware isn’t the differentiating factor; it’s the OS. PCs are not substitutes for Macs. People who desire Macs have to spend more, but those who don’t care for Macs don’t have to pay the high prices due to the availability of less expensive Windows machines. Consumers desiring Windows OS don’t purchase Macs to exclusively run Windows since it would be a waste of money. Consumers purchase Macs for the value-added benefits supplied.

The robust growth in Mac sales demonstrates that consumers are willing to pay more for Macs. Mac’s 70% share of the premium segment suggests that Macs are essentially the only computers for which consumers are willing to pay up. Windows PCs can’t compete in the premium segment against Apple. Premium Windows PCs can’t even compete against lower-priced Windows PCs. Since Macs run Windows (many say Windows runs best on Macs), PCs don’t provide any value-added benefits over Mac. Thus, to create value to the consumer, PC hardware firms cut prices to make their machines relatively attractive. Since the Mac offers Windows OS plus Mac OS, it provides additional benefits that command a premium price.

PC prices have come down a great deal, and continue to fall. However, Mac ASPs have been relatively flat since 2003 (~$1500). It should come as no surprise that Apple’s GM has risen from 26% to 35%, while Hewlett-Packard and Dell have seen their margins shrink. Where are these analysts getting the notion that cheap netbooks will pressure Mac sales when notebook prices have been relatively cheaper for years?

APPLE’S MAC SALES STRATEGY:
The two main reasons why consumers buy a Windows PC instead of a Mac are 1) Unaware of added benefits 2) Aware of added benefits, but assign little value preferring a low benefit package at cheapest price, i.e. price-sensitive. For many, they choose a Windows machine because it’s cheaper. Consumers would pay more if they believed the incremental value added exceeded the incremental cost. Many are unaware/unfamiliar of the incremental value the Mac provides, thus Apple’s primary goal is to inform consumers most likely to perceive added-value.

The primary challenge facing Mac growth is educating the market about Mac benefits. Due to Apple’s tiny market share, its growth potential is massive. At the start of the decade, Apple’s share was roughly 1%-2% and will likely reach 10% by decade-end. The major catalysts to share growth have been the iPod, iPhone, and Apple’s retail store strategy, which have increased Mac curiosity and awareness. For the past couple years, Apple has been reporting that more than 50% of retail Mac sales are to new Mac users. This is no surprise since Mac sales have outpaced the industry by a factory of three (3x).

Remember that Apple’s share of the computer market has been in the low single digits throughout time, only in the last several years did Mac sales takeoff. Therefore, most haven’t used or possibly seen a Mac in the wild. With little or no Mac experience, an individual would have difficultly to justifying the higher price. In addition, consumers don’t actively seek to acquire more information on products that are relatively more expensive. One has to spend more time and effort learning about a product that costs more and ultimately may not be suitable or worth the price. Therefore, expensive, less-known products experience greater difficulty in making the short-list of a consumers consideration set for a given purchase decision. Apple believes its Macintosh provides a superior computing experience. There is evidence supporting that claim as Apple earns the highest satisfaction ratings and gets the best reviews from industry pundits. So, it’s more about informing consumers that its product is the best than it is making its product the best.

Apple leverages the popularity of its iPod and iPhone to heighten attention for Mac. These gadgets arouse curiosity and interest about the Mac, as well as driving traffic to its stores where consumers can experience Macs first-hand.

MAC PRICING STRATEGY:
Since Macs are highly differentiated and offer features/benefits unique to its brand, Apple is afforded significant pricing power. Apple believes since it offers a premium product it should charge a premium price. Exploding demand for Macs seen in the past several years demonstrates that consumers justify paying a higher price (relative to PCs) for the extra value/benefits unique to Apple. Apple believes that there are many potential consumers that would share the same opinion if they were more knowledgeable about Macs.

Cutting prices does little to advance product knowledge for the uninformed consumer. Macs would still be pricier, and the consumer still wouldn’t know why. Thus, reducing Mac prices wouldn’t boost substantially boost demand. Many analysts miss this point. Amazon’s best selling notebooks are all within the $350 - $600 price range. If Apple cut the price on the $1299 MacBook to $1000 or even $800, it’s still more expensive than the more popular, cheaper notebooks. The $999 legacy white plastic MacBook has been less popular at Amazon than the $1299 new aluminum MacBook. There is a bifurcation in the computer market- 1) consumers seeking lowest price 2) consumers seeking value-added. The former are buying netbooks and the latter are buying Macs. If price were as significant an issue as analysts claim, then the $999 MacBook (actually $910) wouldn’t be ranked #15 behind the $1299 MacBook ranked #7.

I believe it’s not the size of the price differential versus the amount of added benefits that is in question. To clarify, it’s not that consumers don’t believe that the higher price of Macs aren’t justified by their unique features, it’s that consumers aren’t aware or don’t care for Mac features. Those who are price-sensitive and seek bare-bones machines are a waste of Apple’s time to pursue.

Apple would have offered larger discounts (as analysts were predicting) on Macs for its Black Friday sale if it thought lower prices would materially affect demand. Unit sales wouldn’t increase very much, but dollar revenue would decline (lower ASPs) when customers are willing to pay the higher prices.

Apple still has an abundance of potential consumers willing to pay premium prices for a computer that Apple has not yet penetrated. It is these consumers that Apple is chasing, the mid to high income demographic, which are less price-sensitive and receptive to a product that offers value-added benefits. Generally, these consumers understand that “one has to pay more to get more,” and that if a product is cheap, “then it’s cheap for a reason.” In addition, sometimes saving some bucks might result in owning a product that is unsatisfactory, or possibly worthless. In these circumstances, one often is forced to make another purchase since the original product was a dud. Thus spending the extra cash, on the margin, makes the most economical sense. In essence, by spending more, one may be actually be paying less considering the long-term costs and product life.

On the 4Q08 conference call (from Seeking Alpha), Steve Jobs remarked: “There are some customers which we choose not to serve. We don’t know how to make a $500 computer that’s not a piece of junk, and our DNA will not let us ship that. But we can continue to deliver greater and greater value to those customers that we choose to serve and there’s a lot of them. And we’ve seen great success by focusing on certain segments of the market and not trying to be everything to everybody. So I think you can expect us to stick with that winning strategy and continuing to try to add more and more value to those products in those customer bases we choose to serve.”

APPLE’S CHALLENGES:
The economic turmoil presents a significant challenge for Apple. As I mentioned previously, it’s not consumers that normally would buy a Mac trading down as some analysts suggest. Consumers either want the added benefits Macs provide, or they desire the basic functionality of Windows OS PCs. If one wants a Mac, then there are no other alternatives; Macs can’t be substituted by Windows PCs opposed to the substitutability of cheaper Windows PCs for more expensive Windows PCs.

The recession won’t cause cheap Windows PCs to take sales away from Macs, instead it will slow the rate that Macs take share from PCs. The higher-end consumer that Apple targets is less sensitive to the economic cycle, yet not immune. Consumers are less receptive to learning about/trying out unfamiliar products, as their mood to spend is subdued. During periods of rising asset prices, the wealth effect reduces the threshold for capturing a consumer’s attention and subsequently closing a sale.

I eventually expect Apple to address the popularity of the netbook segment by introducing a computing device in a tablet form. I imagine it will be something similar to the iPod Touch, yet with more power and viewing area. It will offer the same functions that consumers look for in a netbook, yet the form factor will be different.

CONCLUSION:
The popularity of low-priced PCs stems from the lack of added value for pricier Windows computers, rather than the inability/unwillingness to spend more for a computer. Lower prices are driven by the intense competition among Windows PC manufacturers whereby the primary differentiating factor is price opposed to other value-added benefits. The fact that Mac demand growth (which sell at higher entry price points) has been much higher than the industry indicates that Macs don’t compete on price, but rather features/benefits.

It’s incorrect to assert that Mac sales growth is vulnerable to netbooks or cheap PCs. The real challenge facing Apple in this rough economy is attracting new users and enticing current users to upgrade/replace. New models, the expansion of the retail store footprint, the halo effect from iPod/iPhone, and positive word of mouth are the primary driver in sustaining Apple’s Mac sales.

Disclosure: Long AAPL

What Can Push Apple's Shares Higher?

Apple Inc (nasd:AAPL)- Apple has surged to $180 from $120 where it was trading back in February. Of course, Apple was trading near $200 at the end of December 2007, but sentiment turned and Apple’s shares plummeted January through March before reversing, and staging a rally in April. Shares have been stuck in the $180’s since May. The pivotal question becomes: “what can/will push shares higher?”



Apple’s stock may have gotten ahead of itself at the end of last year (2007), when it hit $200. Analysts were bullish and nearly all had a price target above $200. Then January arrived, Apple provided weak guidance and the Street flipped out. Sentiment quickly turned negative, and heavy selling drove Apple lower. A couple analyst downgraded the stock, and most revised their price targets lower to the $150-175 range. As industry data reports showing potential robust Mac sales became available in March, Apple shares began to recover. Apple announced earnings in April that showed strong Mac sales. This further quelled apprehension and eliminated the overly pessimistic attitude on Wall Street. As the chart illustrates, price targets were revised upward. In short, I believe Apple shares collapsed due to worries that they were overvalued, then information subsequently supported those high share prices, thus Apple’s stock returned to that level.





Apple has been stuck in the $180s since the beginning of May. Nothing has been able to power shares beyond the current range. There have been several analysts raising price targets. However, the effect on Apple’s share price has been insignificant. Apple announced the July arrival of its new 3G iPhone, yet Apple shares were still unsuccessful in breaking out into the $190s.

Apple has announced the expansion of iPhone countries from 5 to 70, as well as a much lower price point of $199. However, EPS estimates for FY09 have only slightly budged.

According to the EPS revisions table, most recent changes to the consensus estimates have been downward.





In my opinion, I think the catalyst for a move higher will be upward revisions to EPS estimates. I don’t think they currently account for the immense sales potential of the new iPhone, as well as the momentum in the demand for Macs. Albeit, Apple is giving up the monthly subscription revenue payments from AT&T, thus the increase in volume will becoming at a lower margin. This might possibly be why Apple’s shares have failed to respond more positively. There are a couple things to consider. First, there have been estimates that the new phone’s manufacturing cost is half of the current iPhone. Second, the MobileMe service at $100 per year adds revenue potential associated with the new iPhone. Sales of iPhone applications from Apple’s App store is another avenue to boost revenue. Most importantly, iPhone sales will expose the Apple brand to many who lack experience, and ultimately boost Mac sales.

I think we will gain more clarity in July, when the new iPhone hits stores and Apple releases Q3 results. It’s likely, until then, there won’t be many developments capable of really moving the stock, other than possible EPS estimate revisions.

Apple isn’t cheap trading at 35x FY08 consensus EPS estimates and 28x FY09. Apple may actually be cheaper if you believe those estimates are too low. I think the estimates are likely too low, thus Apple would be trading at slightly lower multiples. I think Apple could be bought on any weakness or pullbacks, since Apple’s share price reflects the fundamentals as opposed to pure sentiment, as it did last fall and this winter.

Disclosure: none

Advantages to Controlling Hardware Selection and OS Development

PC Magazine contributor Sascha Segan shares his insight on Microsoft’s recent missteps with Vista and Mobile OS in this month’s edition (June ’08). His primary thesis is that there is a disconnect between Microsoft’s OS and the capabilities of hardware components. Microsoft develops software on the assumption that the hardware installed-base would contain the latest, most powerful processors and graphic cards. This became problematic for MSFT when chip and device makers chose to keep costs down by utilizing lower powered circuitry. In short, Microsoft OS is built for the hardware of tomorrow as opposed to that of today.

Firms such as Apple (AAPL) and Research In Motion (RIMM) control the OS and hardware for their products. In my opinion, this gives them an advantage over Microsoft who must tailor its OS to the hardware of multiple manufacturers.

According to Segan, Intel needed to contain its costs, thus it opted for motherboards that included non-Vista-friendly integrated graphics as opposed to a dedicated chip set. Even though Vista operated poorly integrated graphics designed PCs, Microsoft approved its operability. This hardware-software gap caused significant performance issues for consumers.

Eventually, PCs become more powerful thus performance catches up to the needs of the Microsoft’s OS. In past years, this wasn’t a significant issue. However, today, consumers have a more viable alternative as evidenced with the populatity of Apple’s Macintosh. Consumers may not wait for performance to catch up, rather they may be inclined to purchase a Mac instead.

Segan also claims that MSFT has made the same mistake with Windows Mobile OS. It’s designed for processor speeds not found in the majority of mobile handsets. Segan adds “given a choice of making it faster or making it cheaper, most manufacturers will pick cheaper”

We have seen that Vista has had a rocky introduction, and Microsoft recently announced that a “downgrade” to XP would be available for less powerful machines. Mobile OS has been less than stellar as well, albeit improving. My experience with Mobile OS was horrible. I finally ditched the device after becoming fed up with the “spinning hourglass” popping up when trying to answer a call.

I believe Segan’s article illustrates the advantage Apple obtains from controlling both software and hardware functions. This gives Apple total control over the user experience as well as making it very difficult for competitors to duplicate.

I was dismayed when PALM decided to go with Windows Mobile OS for its Treo handsets. This creates several problems. First, MSFT Mobile OS places constraints on PALM’s innovation of its mobile devices. The user experience is dependant on MSFT not necessarily on PALM. Second, it limits PALM’s ability to differentiate its handsets. There isn’t much difference between PALM devices and others running Windows Mobile OS, given that the hardware is the easiest component to replicate. Even if competitors are able to replicate Apple’s or RIM’s devices, the software is still different and protects from “knock-off” models.

Apple has a distinct advantage; it’s devices run seamlessly. Vista’s troubles may partially be responsible for the surge in adoption of Mac computers. The simplicity of Apple’s iPhone OS may prove to be a huge weapon against Windows Mobile OS devices, especially when the iPhone become more price competitive.

Apple recently agreed to purchase PA Semi, a private boutique microprocessor design company known for robust, low-power designs. The true nature of Apple’s plans for the acquisition is unknown; however, PA Semi would aid in creating chips that are optimal for Apple’s OS. In addition, instead of licensing CPU architecture, Apple's proprietary, in-house chip design differentiates itself from competitors who use "off the shelf" chip architecture. With unique OS and CPUs, both aspects can be designed around each other, optimizing performance.

Apple and RIM will continue to outshine other mobile handset device makers using Windows Mobile OS. Even if Mobile OS drastically improves, these manufacturers lack differentiation and will have to compete on price. This increases pressure to utilize less powerful components, which will affect performance. RIM and Apple select the hardware needed to support the OS and do not have to make sacrifices detrimental to performance. MSFT, on the other hand, must design its OS according to the specs of the available hardware. However, since MSFT doesn’t control which hardware will be actually used by manufacturers, it faces a more challenging task.

Investors Overlook the Mac as a Windows PC

Much, if not all attention regarding Apple has been focused on the iPhone. Apple’s recent $200 price reduction on the iPhone resulted in analysts, journalists, and investors debating the true demand for new device. Additionally, the effects of the price cut on Apple’s earnings has been a hot topic of discussion. Certainly the iPhone is relevant to Apple’s performance, but ostensibly it’s the Macintosh computers that will have the most impact. Specifically, Mac’s ability to run Windows natively has the potential to be a colossal catalyst for boosting Mac market share.

Apple released “Bootcamp”, which allows Mac users to install and run Windows just like one would on a PC. Apple’s new OS, OS X 10.5 “Leopard”, slated for release this November will include Bootcamp software. Additionally, third party software called “Parallels” allows users to run Windows and Mac OS simultaneously.

The Windows capability has not yet been aggressively publicized by Apple, and analysts and investors have been relatively quiet on this issue. Yet, for more than two decades, the lack of Windows compatibility has been the primary reason behind consumers’ decision to NOT purchase a Mac computer. Now that Windows can be installed on Macs, sales could really explode. I believe that this aspect of Apple should garner more attention, and I will explain why.

Macs are a perennial top award winner in consumer surveys and industry publications. Marketing research has suggested that for many PC buyers Macs were their first choice, yet they declined to purchase due to the need to run Windows software. Computer buyers employ what marketers refer to as a “non-compensatory” purchase decision model. For every product attribute evaluated and compared, supremacy in most categories cannot offset a deficiency for a particular attribute. Explicably, Macs may score higher in a consumer’s mind for every attribute, but the fact that it’s a non-Windows machine eliminates the purchase possibility from the buyer’s selection set of product alternatives.

Simply, consumers want a machine that runs the same operating system that 95%-99% of all other computers run. In most cases, consumers require a machine than runs windows due to work or school related factors. Alternatively, there is a significant risk in buying a computer that may become extinct or no longer supported by software developers. That was a real concern years ago, when Apple was against the ropes as market share had been estimated to fall as low 1%.

A popular statement: “I really want and prefer to buy a Mac, but I need a Windows machine since that is what we use at work.” The lack of Windows compatibility has been an insurmountable hurdle for Apple for decades even though significant demand for its machines exist.

Apple has certainly recovered since the days of old with market share currently estimated well above 5%. While still miniscule, Apple has delivered substantial progress. The bright side of the matter is the enormous room for potential growth from seizing share from the Windows PC makers- Dell et al.

In one aspect, Mac’s ability to install and run Windows OS makes them no different than Dell, HP, Gateway, etc., which there is little difference among those traditional PC devices. In essence, installing Windows on a Mac means that there are no longer grounds for consumers to eliminate Macs as a products choice on that reason. Thus, a consumer could just as well buy a Dell or Gateway or Mac. Think about it. The primary factor keeping buyers from purchasing a Mac for decades has been overcome. Plus, if that barrier hadn’t existed we know that Mac sales would have been significantly higher. The bottom line: pent-up Mac demand can come to fruition now.

Given that Macs now compete with Dells and HPs as product choice in buying a PC, Macs retain an edge. Macs provide all of the functionality as other PCs, yet the Mac OS serves as a bonus, if you will. Why would someone choose a Dell or Gateway when that can buy a Mac, and not lose Windows functionality, yet gain all the benefits of Mac OS? I think that is a very central question. Especially since Mac prices have become more competitive.

Despite the lack of publicity I think this is huge. We know that there are a significant number of consumers who would prefer to buy a Mac but can’t get past the Windows issue. Now that this is no longer an issue, how many Macs can Apple sell? I can envision some individuals buying a Mac to solely run Windows just because they prefer the aesthetics of Mac’s design.

We have seen a dramatic increase in Mac sales and market share, yet I perceive the general consumer is unaware of the Windows capability. I am confident that when a more aggressive publicity campaign occurs, Mac sales will react robustly. I think that it’s the PC savvy segment, aware of Bootcamp that has been snatching up Macs recently, not entirely the normal, less aware consumer. Just from anecdotal evidence, people I have surveyed exhibit little awareness. Eventually that will change with time, and the impact on Apple’s revenues will be much greater than the iPhone or iPod.

Running dual OS on a single machine allows the Windows to Mac OS migration process much easier. Previously, it has been either one or the other. Moving to Mac OS means turning off the light on Windows. That’s a very difficult process and extremely risky. Any migration works best under a dual, parallel operating environment since it doesn’t require choosing one over the other. Particular tasks can still be handled in the Windows environment if the Mac OS proves to be unsatisfactory. Apple experienced much difficulty in persuading users to abandon Windows for a Mac, now that is no longer an issue.

It’s seems that the only benefit in using Windows is the fact that nearly everyone else uses it too. It’s unstable, crashes frequently and susceptible to a host of viruses. That’s the antithesis of the Mac. Granted there is much more software available to Windows, that will surely change as Mac OS gains acceptance. As more and more software is developed for Mac OS, adoption will follow suit. And as Mac share has been increasing, we have witnessed already increased interest from software developers.

It’s not unreasonable to predict that Apple can progress to 10% share soon. Especially given the “Halo Effect.” Sales of iPhones and iPods will drive consumer interest in Mac computers, and when consumers become more aware of the Windows capability I believe market share can easily reach 30%. It’s not unrealistic to think that Macs could capture even more share. Why not? Apple’s iPod has 70-80% share, and why would a consumer purchase a Dell over a Mac? Price is the only reason that I can think, but for a higher price, the consumer receives more. I know I will never buy a traditional PC again.