Showing posts with label Margins. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Margins. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Apple Inc (AAPL): Weaker Dollar Will Benefit Revenue Growth and Margins

Apple Inc. (nasd:AAPL) Rising gross margins stemming from increased recognition of deferred iPhone revenue has been a key factor in propelling Apple’s share price and EPS. I believe the next major tailwind will be increased revenue growth and higher margins arising from the falling U.S. Dollar. In 2009, 46% of Apple’s total revenue came from overseas, up from 43% in FY08 and 41% in FY07. Including European Apple retail stores, revenue generated in Europe was roughly 30% of total revenue in FY09. International markets are a key source of Apple’s revenue and growth, and a declining dollar is beneficial for the firm. Apple’s performance for the past several quarters was challenged by headwinds from the strengthening USD. Going forward, Apple should benefit from the dollar’s decline. This will lift international revenue growth and boost margins. Alternatively, Apple could choose to lower prices abroad to stimulate product demand to drive volume. I believe many investors overlook the fact that Apple derives nearly half its revenue outside the U.S., thus don’t consider the considerable impact coming from a weaker USD.

The USD had been on a long-term weakening trend up until late 2008 when a string of financial institutions collapsed and panic ensued. This led to a massive influx into U.S. Treasuries, hence the USD. This caused a temporary rise in the USD as investors all over the world sought refuge in securities perceived to be the safest.









Around April/May 2009, money began shifting out of USD leading to the currency weakening. In effect, USD depreciation is a resumption of its previous long-term trend. However, this recent fall in the dollar comes with several new factors that support a long-term dollar decline.

1) Massive stimulus and bailouts
2) Budget deficits
3) Diversification away from USD
4) Weak dollar policy to boost exports and domestic manufacturing

I expect the dollar to continue it’s weakening trend and a return to levels pre-fall 2008. From October to about May, the USD rose considerably, before starting its slide mid-year. Apple generally hedges against currency fluctuations usually 3 to 6 months out, therefore the rise in the USD late-2008 likely didn’t much of an immediate impact. Eventually, the effect of the stronger dollar is felt as new hedges are set at less favorable exchange rates. Apple had warned on its earnings calls that a stronger USD would negatively impact gross margins, thus stated it a as factor for guiding GM lower. However, cheaper components, higher iPhone revenue recognition, increased supply chain efficiencies, and foreign currency hedging more than offset the temporary rise in the USD.  Apple mentioned in its 2009 10-K filing that the stronger USD did have a negative impact on revenue growth abroad for the full year. When hedges expire, Apple can either raise prices to offset the stronger USD or elect to accept lower ASPs in USD terms. Even though the USD began to fall back in April/May, it’s likely Apple has yet to feel the full benefit of the dollar’s decline due to currency hedges still in effect. 


The tables below compare product pricing from Apple’s online store for France, U.K., Canada, Australia, and Japan at most recent exchange rates versus rates in early 2009 when the USD was at its highs. Some of the pricing includes VAT, so the price differential between U.S. product prices and Euro zone is overstated, but the focus here is the difference between most recent prices (weak dollar) versus prices when the dollar was stronger during late 2008 - early 2009. In Europe, where Apple receives nearly 30% of its total revenues, prices have risen more that 20% in USD terms. In general, that would equate to a 6% increase in overall ASPs.





A weaker dollar does imply higher product costs since Apple sources components and manufacturing outside the U.S., namely Asia. However, the negative impact of a weaker dollar in terms of product costs is much less than the benefit of higher ASPs in USD terms. This is because: 1) costs are a smaller percentage of overall selling price 2) Apple enters into long-term supply agreements and also has significant leverage over suppliers 3) China’s currency is fixed to the USD as it prefers a weak currency to support exports.

In summary, Apple faced currency headwinds for much of FY09 which I expect will turn into tailwinds for FY10. This factor hasn’t been mentioned much in the investment community. A weak dollar will boost ASPs (in USD terms), hence international revenue growth as well as lift gross margins. Apple could also choose to take advantage of the weakening dollar by cutting prices where it sees elastic demand. Therefore, I expect GM will continue to show strength aiding in the growth of Apple’s bottom line.

Disclosure: Long AAPL.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Apple Inc (AAPL): iPhone's Substantial Impact on Gross Margin

Margins held steady Q/Q at 36.3% (down 10 bps) versus expectation of ~200 bps of margin contraction due to mounting headwinds.

Management issued Q4 GM guidance of 34%, 100 bps higher than Q3 33% GM guidance (which AAPL exceeded by 330 bps).

Considering the number of challenging cost environment Apple's Q3 performance and Q4 GM guidance are huge positives.

(1) Apple was able to maintain gross margins for Q3 and (2) According to Apple's guidance, I expect GM to hold in Q4.

The past two quarters have seen a significant lift in gross margins compared to the 3 periods prior (3Q08-1Q09) in which GM held steady at 34.7%. The rise in GM has be a major factor in the near doubling of the stock price since the January low. In the 2nd half of FY08, management started a chorus that it expects 30% GM for FY09. Even when GM turned out to be healthy for Q1 & Q2, Apple maintained its 30% GM outlook. This had many analysts and investors worried.

Last October, I reported Apple's FY09 Gross Margin Expectations Too Low arguing that GM will for FY09 will come in way above the 30% guidance. In January, I wrote Apple's FY09 EPS Estimate Too Low stating that the forecasted decline in FY09 EPS by analysts wasn't not going to happen and that earnings should increase by at least 5-10% versus FY08. (For the 3 quarters already reported for FY09, EPS is up ~8% versus the same 3 quarters for FY08.) The main thesis was gross margins would come in significantly above expectations mostly due to high margin iPhone revenue becoming a larger share of total sales.

1) Mitigated numerous factors pressuring margins.
- Transitioned entire notebook line.
- Cut prices across entire notebook line and/or added increased performance.
- Back to School promotion (Mac discounts plus free 8GB iPod touch).
- Revenue mix shifted towards lower margin Macs from weak business spending affecting the Mac Pro line.
- Component prices increased, coupled with higher commodity and energy prices.

Apple repositioned its entire notebook line, cutting prices significantly on Macbook air, and on 15" and 17" inch Macbook Pros. Apple also introduced 13" Macbook pros in place of the older aluminum body Macbooks. Macbook prices were cut anywhere from $100-$300. In addition, Apple kicked off its "Back to School" program that offers discounts on Macs plus a free iPod touch valued at $229. As a result, coupled with weak business spending, revenue was skewed towards the lower-margin models.

2) Guidance of 34% translates into GM likely coming in the 36%-38% range.
- Past 4 quarters GM has exceeded guidance by an average of 370 basis points.
- GM guidance has increased sequentially 3 quarters in a row. (2Q-32.5%, 3Q-33%, 4Q-34%)

Apple has routinely sandbagged on GM guidance by and average of 350 bps over the past 11 periods, and 370 bps for the last 4 quarters. In addition, over the past 10 quarters, when Apple has raised guidance sequentially, GM either rose or remained flat sequentially except for one instance. The scatter plot of change in guidance on x-axis versus change in actual GM on y-axis demonstrates managements accuracy in forecasting GM at least with respect to direction. Therefore, we can expect GM will up or at least flat in Q4 even in light of the challenging headwinds.







iPhone Contribution:
The profitability of the iPhone has played, and will pay a major roll in Apple's overall gross margins. Since Apple refuses to comment about product level margins, the iPhone's significance is often missed. Apple neglects to mention the iPhone angle due to the fact it doesn't want to discuss product level gross margins. The reasons for doing so are vast: firms desire to "cry poor" for the more money they rake in, the more money others will want to get a piece of. This extends to customers, carriers, suppliers, and competitors. Apple repeatedly exclaims it doesn't want to create an "umbrella" that would attract competitors to enter and undercut it. Therefore, much of the GM upside has been due to iPhone revenue being and increased percentage of total revenue, and since iPhone revenue is deferred, this trend will continue to intensify. I have been writing about this effect for nearly a year.

According to my Apple model, (which is i consider accurate being that its EPS variance has been 4 cents, 2 cents, 1 cent, and ZERO for the past 4 quarters) iPhone contributes an equal amount to EPS as does the Mac segment, and will surpass Mac's EPS contribution in the quarters going forward.

In Apple's 10-Q filings, it breaks out deferred revenue and deferred costs for iPhone and AppleTV reported on the balance sheet. Since AppleTV is a minute sliver of deferred revenue it is assumed that its impact on total deferred revenue (AppleTV + iPhone) is immaterial.



Looking at 4Q07, GM of deferred revenue (1- (deferred costs/deferred revenue)) is 27.5%. It was low since Apple received monthly revenue payments in place of an upfront subsidy as is the case today. 4Q08 comprised of the first quarter of subsidized 3G handsets, thus the bump in GM on the DR/DC on the balance sheet. Notice the non-current GM of 51.9% is 6.5% higher than the 45.3% GM of the current. This results from the non-current bucket comprising of a larger mix of 3G iPhones since much of the legacy (2.5G) iPhones have migrated to the current bucket.

Examining the trend, we can see that GM in the current bucket improves dramatically, at a much faster pace than the non-current bucket. This is due to the mix of new iPhones becoming a larger overall mix in the current bucket, whereas the non-current bucket is already majority of newer iPhone sales. The overall result is than GM are approaching near 60%, which I estimate iPhone GM is currently. This is evidenced by the rising GM Q/Q, especially in the non-current bucket which is impacted more by current sales.

My bottom-up iPhone gross margin estimate is 58.4% for the assumed mix, with the iPhone 3GS 32GB garnering the highest GM and the iPhone 3GS 16GB carrying the lowest of the 3 models.



The Bottom Line:
Deferred revenue as stated on the balance sheet has been increasing substantially. The gross margin attached to this deferred revenue has also increased significantly. Thus, going forward Apple will recognize higher iPhone revenue carrying a higher gross margin. As iPhone revenue as a percentage or share of total revenue increases, the impact of the higher iPhone GM on overall GM will intensify. This will assuage margin pressures Apple faces in other areas.

I wrote last year that the iPhone would cause Apple's overall GM to skyrocket, but I also posited another possibility. Apple would use iPhone GM to subsidize price cuts on other products to stimulate demand and ultimately avoiding an adverse impact on overall GM associated with such price reductions. As we just witnessed, Apple cut prices on its Mac line-up, and there hasn't appeared to be any noticeable impact on overall GM. Going forward, Apple is guiding Q4 GM to 34%, suggesting GM in the 36%-38% range, thus there doesn't appear that these price reductions will have a dramatic impact on its overall GM.

Monday, November 17, 2008

Calculating Gross Margin for Apple's iPhone (4Q08)

APPLE INC (nasd:AAPL) According to my calculations, deferred revenue booked from Q4 iPhone sales carries a 55.5% gross margin. Gross margin on the deferred revenue (DR) booked from the first generation model averages about 29%. The average gross margin for total booked DR is 47.8%.

I derived this number from the “deferred expense under subscription accounting“ that Apple disclosed in its annual filing (10-K) in conjunction with the deferred revenue (under subscription accounting) also reported. I used some rather extensive math to come up with the 55.5% number which I discuss below.

Apple’s ”Non-GAAP“ figures it provided for Q4 implies that 3G iPhone GM was 47.8%. According to the 10-K, GM for iPhone deferred revenue not yet recognized in income is also 47.8%. Coincidence? Not likely. Since the deferred revenue carried on the balance sheet includes both the original and 3G models, that GM should differ from the GM implied by Q4 Non-GAAP numbers that solely comprise of 3G unit sales. We know that the GM on the 3G model is much higher than the first model.

So why is the GM according to Apple’s Non-GAAP figures the same as the GM derived from the 10-K? Apple included estimated future warranty expenses in the adjusted cost-of-goods sold (COGS), which inflates Non-GAAP COGS and understates GM. The amount of estimated expense is at Apple’s discretion. In my opinion, Apple overstated the Non-GAAP COGS adjustment for the sake of conservatism, but also to obscure the true iPhone GM. Normally, under GAAP accounting (subscription), Apple recognizes iPhone warranty expenses as incurred. However, Apple added its estimates for future warranty liability into the COGS adjustment, and I believe management was very conservative.

The gross margin on the iPhones sold in Q4 that will be recognized over the coming seven quarters is 55.5%. There will be some warranty expense incurred, yet I expect it to be relatively small. It’s likely that most of the warranty liability is incurred during the period sold. If a unit is defective, the problem usually surfaces shortly after it’s purchased.

I estimate the normalized gross margin is even higher, possibly north of 60%. Thus, iPhones sold in 1Q09 and beyond will carry higher GMs, assuming ASPs remain constant. iPhone GMs for Q4 were abnormally compressed due to elevated shipping costs, adapter recall, and other various expenses related to the global introduction of the new 3G model.

Gross Margin- Non-GAAP Reported Q4:
For the first time, Apple provided adjusted figures showing the actual iPhone sales/income earned in the quarter. Until Q4, Apple always gave the GAAP numbers that uses subscription accounting for iPhone sales. Instead of recognizing the actual revenue earned for the quarter, it is spread over 24 months and amortized on a straight-line basis. Using normal accounting methods, total revenue would have been 3.787B higher, or 11.682B. Cost of goods sold (COGS) increases 1.975B to 7.161B. Overall gross margins improve from 34.7% (GAAP) to 39.0%, which equates to a 47.8% GM for the iPhone adjustment ([revenue adjustment - COGS adjustment] / revenue adjustment).

However, the 47.8% figure is not the true iPhone GM. First, the adjustments include AppleTV sales, yet that amount is believed to be quite small relative to the iPhone, thus the effect is probably very minimal. Second, and most important, is that Apple included the estimated warranty costs for over its full life in the COGS adjustment.


iPhone Gross Margin- Deferred Revenue/Costs Reported in 10-K:
Without knowing the amount of deferred iPhone cost booked in a quarter, it’s impossible to calculate iPhone gross margins. Apple’s quarterly filings discloses the iPhone portion of deferred revenue which is reported was a liability on the balance sheet, but Apple never broke out the iPhone related deferred costs that is included in an asset account. The actual amount of iphone revenue earned in a quarter can be determined by adding the change in DR account (+) the amount of iPhone revenue recognized in income. To find the actual product costs, we need the change in deferred costs. In its annual filing, Apple disclosed the amount of iPhone related deferred cost on the books at the end of Q4, but we don’t know the Q3 number.

Using the DR & DC at year-end, an average GM (of all iPhone sales) can be found. At year-end, Apple had $5.78B in DR and $3.02B in DC on its books, which translates into a 47.8% gross margin for all the iPhone sales still be amortized. Since Apple gives the figures for current (less than 1yr) and long-term accounts, we can gain additional insight into iPhone margins. For the iPhone sales that will be recognized within a year, the average GM is 45.1%, and for the non-current portion, the GM is 51.9%.

The reason for the 7% difference is due to 3G sales, which carries a much higher margin than the original iPhone. Almost all the non-current DR & DC is related to the 3G, since iPhones sold in 4Q07 & 1Q08 have moved from the non-current to current bucket. Only a small portion of Q2 sales would be left in non-current, and Q3 sales were low, thus the figures classified as non-current are almost entirely associated with 3G sales. The actual percentage of 3G models can be estimated from the change in DR from Q/Q compared to the actual ending balance. Current DR increased 2.129B to 3.518B, which means 60.5% of current DR is from 3G. Long-term DR increased 1.63B to 2.62B, but the actual amount of 3G classified as non-current is higher because of the portion of legacy iPhone revenue recognized for the quarter. I estimate that 320M of DR was recognized in Q4. Roughly 86% of non-current DR is from 3G sales.


Actual 3G iPhone Gross Margin Calculation:
With the figures for (1) average GM for both current and long-term [45.1% / 51.9%], and (2) the percentage of units which are 3Gs for both classifications [61% / 86%], I solved for the “true” 3G iPhone gross margin by setting up 3 simultaneous equations. The goal is to find the GM number (for both the 3G units and the legacy units) that produces the same combined gross margin for all three classifications (current, non-current, total). As I mentioned above, I solved for the percentages or “weights” of each model represented in the amount of deferred revenue reported on Apple’s balance sheet. Using those weights, the solution I found was 3G gross margin of 55.1% and 29.2% GM for the original model units. When the 3G & legacy gross margins are multiplied by the percentage weights for all three classifications (Total, Current, Non-Current), the products equal the same gross margin extracted from Apple’s 10-K.



(1) Total deferred: 47.8(all)= .71(MGN[3G]) + .29(MGN[2.5G])
(2) Current Deferred: 45.1(all) = .61(MGN[3G]) + .39(MGN[2.5G])
(3) Non-Current Deferred: 51.9(all) = .86(MGN[3G]) + .14(MGN[2.5G])

Conclusion:
If my math is correct, the gross margin on the DR booked from 3G iPhones sold in Q4 (Sep 08) is 55.5%. This means over the next seven quarters, Q4 iPhone sales that will be recognized in current earnings contribute 55.5% GM. Yet, gross margins on units sold going forward will materially exceed the 55.5% generated on Q4 sales.

The rationale for thinking the normalized GM will be higher is due to excess product expense related to the roll-out. Shipping costs were abnormally inflated due to pressures created by supply shortages. The elevated expenses were due to more shipments of smaller lot sizes expedited at quicker delivery times. In short, distribution costs weren’t optimized, yet it’s better to spend a little more to make a sale, than to try to contain costs and forego a sale. For example, iPhones ordered through AT&T direct fulfillment were being delivered individually by FedEx. In addition, Apple stores were receiving smaller shipments but more frequently, on an as-needed basis, so that some stores don’t get too much stock leaving others short. Now that demand and supply factors are in balance, Apple is able to reduce distribution expense by shipping larger lot amounts, less regularly at non-expedited speeds.

Another item inflating product costs was the power adapter recall. Not only does this cause material costs to increase, shipping and packaging costs were likely unfavorably impacted as well.

Going forward, I foresee rising margins resulting from efficiency gains in distribution along with lower product costs resulting from falling component prices and scale benefits. Another item of note, the end of September Apple began selling unlocked iPhones online to Hong-Kong for roughly $685/$799 (free shipping). These prices are quite higher than what Apple receives on other iPhone sales. It’s possible that Apple can do decent volume through the Hong-Kong channel given the propensity for iPhones to find their way into grey markets, such as China, Thailand, Vietnam and others. It’s interesting that Apple decided to sell unlocked, open carrier iPhones only to Hong-Kong which makes one wonder if this is a direct response to the stubbornness of Chinese carriers.

Massive iPhone margins provide Apple with the ability to reduce selling price and still earn a generous profit. Apple has a key advantage over other mobile handset makers that don’t have nearly as high GMs. I expect Apple to eventually lower iPhone prices, but given the iPhone’s superior value proposition, a price cut shouldn’t be needed for some time. However, that doesn’t preclude Apple from doing so just to make competitors life difficult.

Apple could use the colossal iPhone margins to subsidize price reductions on other products if needed. Given the difficult economic environment, this is a very beneficial arrow for Apple to have in its quiver to draw upon.

Disclosure: Long AAPL

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Apple's FY09 Gross Margin Expectations Too Low

Apple Inc (nasd: AAPL) - Apple’s FY09 gross margin should well-exceed management’s guidance of 30%. There are multiple factors that will support FY09 gross margins. 1) As iPhone’s revenue contribution to total company sales increases, overall gross margins will rise since the iPhone carries a very high GM. 2) There will be a more favorable component price environment created by plunging commodity and energy prices. 3) As production volume rises for the iPhone and MacBooks, scale effects and cost efficiencies will benefit drive down product costs. 4) Higher revenues supply leverage by spreading fixed costs across a higher revenue base.

Apple’s guidance is way too conservative; yet considering the economic landscape, management is exercising prudence. This cushion should help Apple exceed earnings expectations even if the economy adversely affects its business. With gross margin expectations so low, Apple’s revenue growth could turn out worse than expected and still match/beat EPS estimates. Alternatively, Apple could use the gross margin cushion for lowering prices to boost demand if warranted.

Market Reaction to Lowered Guidance:
On the Q3 2008 earnings call back in July, Apple guided Q4(Dec) gross margin down to 31.5% which concerned investors after reporting a healthy 34.8% for Q3 (June). Much more troubling was the 30% GM guidance for FY09, down significantly from FY07 average of 34.2% and 34.1% average for FY08’s first 3 quarters. Apple’s shares had an ugly reaction. The weak GM guidance was shocking surprise for Wall Street. Management didn’t provide a clear explanation for the reduced GM guidance. The general perception in the investment community was that Apple was planning to drastically lower its prices which was seen has having negative implications. The popular belief was that Apple must have started to see a dramatic slowdown in demand at higher price points. A few examples being mentioned- competition will intensify, other firms will introduce alternative products at much lower prices, consumers won’t be able to afford or willing to pay premium prices. Many dismissed the possibility that Apple could be providing overly conservative guidance. In addition, many were overlooking the possibility that Apple would only cut prices and accept a lower gross margin because there would be a positive impact on the bottom line.

Gross Margin Guidance Historical Overview:
Management developed the reputation for repeatedly low-balling its gross margin estimates. For the 5 quarters- 1Q07 to 1Q08, Apple exceeded its gross margin guidance by an average of 14.1%. Yet, that trend ended for 2Q08 & 3Q08, when Apple only beat GM guidance by 2.8% & 5.5%, respectively (4.1% avg). Therefore, when Apple provided that week guidance for Q4 on the July call, investors reacted very negatively since the guidance for Q2 & Q3 had been relatively accurate.

In 3Q08 (June) Apple reported its gross margin was 34.8%, which exceeded guidance by about 180 basis points. Management stated that several factors contributed to better than expected margins. First, the one-time true-up of contract manufacturer deferred margin added 70 bps. Second, the remaining 110 basis points resulted primarily from lower commodity prices, a more favorable product mix with respect to margins, and the leverage effect of higher-than-expected revenue.

For the reduced gross margin guidance for Q4, Apple gave three primary factors for the expected sequential GM decline. 1) The full quarter impact of the back-to-school promotion 2) A future product transition 3) The one-time true-up of contract manufacturer deferred margin realized in Q3 (June).



Q4 2008 Gross Margin Exceeds Expectations
:
Apple beat management’s GM estimates by a sizable margin (320 bps): 34.7% actual vs. 31.5% guidance. I was surprised because I had been expecting GM to come in at 32% with a possible upside of 50-100 bps. I expected the back-to-school promotion would have a larger impact on overall margin.

Apple offered students a full price rebate for 8GB iPod Touch ($299) purchased along with a Mac. The iPod sale is recorded, and then once it’s rebated, the sales price is applied as a reduction to sales for both iPod and Mac, in proportion of the iPod and Mac sale. This probably results in about 80% of the rebate being applied to Mac revenue and 20% to iPod revenue. This noticeably impacted Macbook ASP which fell $93 sequentially, from $1,440 in Q3 down to $1,347 for Q4. The decline year/year was $69.

The iPod ASP fell to $150, its lowest ever. However, the sequential decline was only $2 and $9 year/year. In September, Apple introduced new iPods carrying lower price tags. The 16GB & 32GB Touch dropped $100, and the 8GB model saw a $70 reduction. Even though the lowered prices only prevailed for roughly 3 weeks of the quarter, Apple shipped a good number of units into the channel before quarter-end to alleviate the wide-spread shortage Thus, the amount of units sold with the new pricing was larger than what one would expect given the short length of time.

4Q08 Gross Margin Analysis:
Management stated that improved component pricing was primarily responsible for GM exceeding guidance. I believe that component pricing will only get more favorable and should even have a more robust impact going forward. It’s likely that most products sold in Q4 contained inputs procured months back at higher prices, especially given Apple uses FIFO accounting method. In the coming quarters, components will have be acquired at significantly cheaper prices, and those price will likely continue to fall.

Apple said that higher carrier payments on legacy iPhones was a secondary factor contributing to higher-than-expected GM. This is perplexing. No 2.5G iPhone units were sold in the September quarter. Only 717K units were sold in the June quarter; the majority of sales likely occurred during the early half since supply was virtually gone by the end of May. In addition, a decent number of the June quarter sales were unlocked and exported. Therefore, the number of units generating carrier payments would have not materially increased in the September qtr versus the June qtr. Thus, if anything, payment revenue would be slightly better than flat. Yet, total revenue increased by $431M which would have diluted the impact on gross margin.

Actually, the population of first generation iPhones with revenue payments decreased in Q4. With no additional 2.5G units were sold during the period, the number fell since 2.5G units were replaced with 3G models. My understanding is that this would curtail the carrier payments on those units. I estimate over 3M units had attached carrier payments and by end of Q4, 500K to 1M legacy iPhones were replaced by 3G. Unless there is some huge one-time payout, or a similar agreement, payments from wireless providers should have decreased. Due to the massive subsidy being paid by AT&T on 3G models coupled with the fact that legacy iPhone customers could upgrade without penalty, It seems very unlikely that there would be any such payments that would materially affect GM. Another interpretation is that management expected higher fallout of original iPhones carrying shared revenue payments, thus the actual revenue decline was less than expected.

I believe robust sales of the new 3G model (that resulted in a near doubling of recognized Q4 iPhone revenue) had a meaningful impact.

Due to massive 3G iPhone unit sales, revenue recognized in Q4 almost doubled sequentially. iPhone revenue reported in Q2 & Q3 amounted to roughly 5% of total sales. Yet, Q4 iPhone revenue constituted over 10% of total sales. With iPhone margins around 50%, the impact is noticeable. Assuming GM for non-iPhone segments was 33.1% and iPhone GM was 49%, Q4 GM would have been 33.9%, or 80 bps lower is iPhone was 5% of total sales instead of 10%.

Gross Margin Outlook Q1 2009:
Gross margins might see a slight to moderate decline sequentially in the December quarter due to the reduced prices for iPods and the higher manufacturing cost associated with the new generation of MacBooks. Apple guided GM to 30%-31%; taking the midpoint of 30.5%, GM would decline 420 bps Q/Q. That’s a significant decrease which is tough to grasp because of the multiple factors that should benefit gross margin.

Positives-
1) There will not be the negative impact of the back-to-school promotion.
2) Commodity and energy prices continue to fall, and the drop-off in component demand is improving Apple’s product cost. I don’t foresee this trend reversing in the near-term.
3) Q1 iPhone revenue will increase (larger % of total sales) providing further GM support since iPhone margins are much higher than overall company GM.

Unknown-
1) How much higher production costs are for the MacBooks.
2) How conservative the guidance is.

Given the mix of favorable factors at play, product costs for new MacBooks would have to be very large to counteract the upward margin pressure AND drive GM down 420 bps. That doesn’t appear likely.



Financial Alchemist FY09 GM Outlook:
In addition to the items discussed above, the primary GM driver in FY09 will be the iPhone.

Using regular accounting, whereby all revenue/expense are recognized in period incurred, the 4Q08 GM was 39% compared to 34.7% reported using the subscription method. The non-GAAP figures Apple provided take out iPhone amortized revenue/product cost reported under GAAP, then adds total revenue/product expense for the units shipped during the quarter. This highlights the huge disconnect between accounting earnings and cash earnings. The subscription method, whereby revenues and product expense are amortized over 24 month period, causes the reported GAAP numbers to be highly misleading.

iPhone revenue would have increased by 3.79B, from 806M to 4.59B. This represents nearly 40% of total revenue. Granted, this includes AppleTV revenue, but its contribution is believed to be insignificant.

Also impressive is the leverage effect- operating margin is 27.9% vs 18.3% under GAAP. Apple expenses associated operating costs as incurred, and defers the product cost and revenue. This weighs on operating margin because only a portion of the revenue related to the expense is recognized. Theoretically, this benefits margins in the next period since the deferred revenue to be recognized will have had its associated SG&A fully expensed in the prior period. However, SG&A costs are necessary to operate the business, thus there will be new non-product expenses arising in every period. As deferred revenue builds, the amount recognized increases by quarter offsetting the related operating expenses. Selling and advertising costs associated with the iPhone should be the highest in the months following the launch. This creates a favorable situation where recognized revenue is rising coupled with falling non-product costs.

First: With subscription accounting, operating margins should improve as the amount of revenue recognized flowing from deferred revenue increases. Second: Overall gross margins will rise as the high-margin iPhone revenue becomes a greater percentage of total sales. Thus, going forward, the iPhone should lift margins.

I believe the low GM guidance for FY09 is overly conservative. The iPhone GM is likely higher than 50%. Q4 GM was 39% sales in the period fully recognized. We can see the upward trend. Thus, GM somewhere else has to sharply decline. The new MacBooks are likely to create some pressure, but how much? Hard to say until we get Q1 numbers. Even so, those costs should moderate with increasing production volume along with lower component prices.

Apple could also trade margin for volume if demand elasticity appears to be favorable. Hence, keep GM in low 30’s by using iPhone margin to subsidize price reductions on other products to drive volume. Apple consumers are not very price sensitive, therefore something Apple is not likely to do. Considering the economic backdrop, it’s not a bad alternative to have on the table.

Conclusion:
FY09 gross margins will come in way above management’s guidance of 30%. The iPhone, with it’s staggering margins, will become a larger contributer to overall revenue, thus it will drive GM higher. Management is being excessively conservative, and the ultra-low GM guidance provides a cushion in the event that Apple’s business considerably deteriorates. A more favorable commodity and component price environment will also lend support to margins. As management stated, costs from the iPod and MacBook transition should also decreases from volume manufacturing and cost engineering as the firm moves along the cost curve. AAPL shares are pricing in lower margins as analysts are looking for FY09 EPS to be flat versus FY08. Even in a tough economic environment, I foresee better results.

Disclosure: Long Apple

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

A Look at the 3G iPhone's Profitability

Apple’s 3G iPhone appears to be quite profitable. The fully subsidized price from AT&T is $199/$299 for the 8GB/16GB models, respectively- requiring a 2-year contract. If a current AT&T customer has recently purchased a discounted phone, then the price may increase up to $399/$499, depending how much subsidy AT&T needs to recover on the old phone. Without a 2-year contract from AT&T, the iPhone will cost $599/699.

The actual amount Apple receives per iPhone is uncertain. Wall Street analysts estimate AT&T is paying a $300-$350 subsidy. The AT&T pricing scheme suggests the subsidy may be as high as $400 per unit.

Even though $200 is the industry standard for smart phone subsidies, there are many reasons that support the higher estimates.

1) AT&T is increasing data plan by $10/mo and no longer offering 200 free text messages. Most iPhone plans will increase by $15/mo. This equates to a $360 increase over the life of the contract.
2) AT&T’s average revenue per user (ARPU) is roughly $50/mo, where the iPhone ARPU is north of $90/mo. Thus, iPhone users generate $960 more per 24-month contract.

Therefore, a $350 subsidy is quite reasonable and perhaps conservative. Using this assumption, Apple receives $550/$650 from AT&T.

A recent estimate by iSuppli puts the production cost at $173 for the 8GB unit. The 16GB model adds only $16 more to cost; yet it sells for $100 more than the 8GB device. Gross profit for the 8GB model is $376 at a selling price of $550. The 16GB model has a gross profit of $460 selling at $650. The gross margins calculate to 68% and 71% for the 8GB/16GB, respectively.
The 16GB adds $84 in incremental gross profit, or nearly a $1/share per 10 million units. Thus, the model mix can significantly impact the income statement.

Initial data suggests that consumers are favoring the 16GB model. This is very positive since the $16GB produces $100 more in revenue and has a higher gross margin.

According to the retail store availability information on Apple’s website, the 16GB model has been dramatically outselling the 8GB model. However, one problem is the supply of 8GB versus 16GB is unclear. Early Saturday, Apple’s website reported 20 stores sold-out of 8GB, versus 28 stores sold-out of 16GB-white and 53 for the 16GB-black. This indicates significantly higher demand for the 16GB models.



It’s also likely that Apple had a larger stock of 16GB devices due to higher demand for larger capacity historically. In addition, it’s less advantageous to carry to little stock of the higher-priced model since running out of the 8GB may persuade a consumer to trade up to the 16GB. Conversely, higher supply of 16GB models prevents losing potential sales of the higher-priced model when a stock-out forces one to purchase the cheaper model.

A survey by Piper Jaffray of 283 line waiters this weekend reported that 66% planned to purchase the 16GB model. This ratio of 2:1 would support the data gleaned from Apple’s website regarding iPhone availability.

Saturday, July 7, 2007

Industry Analysis: Porter's Five Forces Driving Competition

Porter's 5 Forces Model:

I. Threat of Potential Entrants-
Barriers to Entry
1. Economies of Scale
• Refer to declines in unit costs of a product as the absolute volume per period increases.
• Scale economies may be present in many functional areas: manufacturing, purchasing, R&D, marketing, service network, and distribution.
• Its possible to share economies across businesses within a firm if there are shared costs and/or shared benefits such as intangible assets such as brand strength and know-how
• Barriers can occur with economies to vertical integration
• New entrants are faced with huge cost disadvantages if they can not enter in minimum efficient scale
2. Product Differentiation
• Established firms have brand identification and loyalties, which stem from past advertising, customer service, product differentiation, or being the pioneer.
• Entrants are forced to spend heavily to overcome existing customer loyalties
3. Capital Requirements
• If large sums are capital are needed a barrier may exist especially if its risky or unrecoverable, upfront investment such as advertising and R&D.
• Most firms have access to capital, but if risky cost of capital will be high thus giving the advantage to the incumbent firms.
4. Switching Costs
• If switching costs are high, new entrants must provide a substantial inducement for customers to switch from an incumbent.
5. Access to Distribution Channels
• If incumbent firms have channels tied up, new entrant must provide incentives to channel members to accept its product through price breaks and advertising allowances
• New entrants may have to create new channels if the established ones are characterized by strong, symbiotic relationships among the members
6. Cost Disadvantages Independent of Scale
• Established firms may have cost advantages not replicable by potential entrants no matter what their size and attained economies of scale.
1. Proprietary product technology or patents
2. Favorable access to raw materials- established firms may have locked up most favorable sources
3. Favorable locations
4. Government subsidies
5. Learning or experience curve- unit costs decrease as firm gains more cumulative experience in producing a product. Costs decline because workers improve their methods and become more efficient (learning curve), layout improvements, and technology improvements.
7. Government Policy
• Government could limit entry by licensing requirements and limits on access to raw materials.
• Pollution control and product safety requirements
Expected Retaliation-
• Expectations of existing competitors will influence threat of entry
• History of vigorous retaliation
• Established firms with resources to fight back, including excess cash and borrowing capacity, exceed productive capacity, or great leverage with distribution channels or customers
• Established firms with great commitment to the industry and highly illiquid assets
• Slow industry growth: limits industry’s ability to absorb a new firm
Entry Deterring Price-
• Entry deterring price is the prevailing structure of prices which balances the potential rewards from entry with expected costs of overcoming structural entry barriers and risking retaliation
Properties of Entry Barriers
• Entry barriers can and do change as conditions change
• Firms’ strategic decisions affect entry barriers such as increasing advertising or establishing a distribution network or vertical integration; all can increase economies of scale thus barriers to entry


II. Intensity in Rivalry of Existing Competitors
1. Numerous or Equally Balanced Competitors
• With numerous competitors- increased risk of maverick firms who might think they won’t be noticed
• If few, equal competitors - may be prone to fight each other and if have similar resources, they probably have similar strategies thus same target market
2. Slow Industry Growth
• Slow growth turns competition into a market share game for firms seeking growth..
3. High Fixed or Storage Costs
• High fixed costs create strong pressures for firms to fill capacity which leads to price cutting when excess capacity is present
4. Lack of Differentiation or Switching Costs
• If offerings are perceived as commodity or near commodity, then competition is based on price and service, resulting in intense price competition
5. Capacity Added in Large Increments
• Risks of overcapacity thus periods of price-cutting to fill capacity
6. Diverse Competitors
• Competitors may have a hard time reading each other’s intentions accurately and agreeing on the rules of the game
7. High Strategic States
• Firm may have increased pressure to succeed in a particular industry in order to further its overall corporate strategy.
8. High Exit Barriers
• Exit barriers are economic, strategic, and emotional factors that keep firms from leaving poor industries
i. Specialized assets with low liquidation values
ii. Fixed costs of exit: labor agreements, resettlement costs
iii. Strategic Interrelationships: Image, shared costs
iv. Emotional barriers: loyalty to stakeholders, pride, fear
v. Government and social restrictions: govt. denial or discouragement for exit


III. Pressure from Substitute Products
• Substitutes perform the same function as the products in the industry, satisfy same needs and wants
• Substitutes that merit attention are ones improving their price performance trade-off and highly profitable products
• Substitutes limit returns by placing ceiling on prices


IV. Bargaining Power of Buyers
1. Purchases Large Volumes Relative to Seller Sales
• Raises importance of buyer’s business in firms performance
2. Products Represent Significant Fraction of Buyers Costs or Purchases
• Buyers are price sensitive and will search for best deals
3. The Products are Undifferentiated or Standard
• If buyers can find alternatives may play one supplier against another
4. Buyers Face Few Switching Costs
5. Buyer can Influence Purchase Decision of Consumers
• Retail has power over manufacturers when they can influence purchasing decisions- such as products that require sales assistance like appliances
6. Buyers Earn Low Profits
• Creates great incentives for buyers lower purchasing costs and find or bargain for best deal
7. Buyers Pose Threat of Backward Integration
• If pose threat, buyers are in a position to demand concessions
8. Quality Unimportant to Quality of Buyer’s Product or Services
• If quality is important then buyers are less price sensitive
9. Buyers Have Full Information
• If buyers have full info about demand, actual market prices, and even supplier costs, this provides greater bargaining leverage then when information is poor


V. Bargaining Power of Suppliers
1. Dominated by Few Sellers and More Concentrated than Industry it Sells to -
• Suppliers selling to more fragmented buyers will have more influence in prices, quality, terms
2. Suppliers Do Not Face Threat of Substitutes
• Power of large, powerful suppliers can be checked if they compete with substitutes.
3. The Industry is not Important Customer of Supplier Group
• If suppliers sell to many industries, and a particular industry does not represent a significant fraction of sales, suppliers can exert power
• If industry is important customer, suppliers fortunes will be tied to the industry, therefore they will want to protect it with reasonable pricing and assistance in activities like R&D and Lobbying
4. Suppliers Group Products are Differentiated/ Switching Costs involved
• Buyers facing switching costs or differentiation does not allow them to play suppliers against one another
• High switching costs can place firms at the mercy of their suppliers
5. Suppliers Product is Important Input to Buyer’s Business
• If input is important to manufacturing process or product quality then supplier power is increased.
6. Threat of Forward Integration
• This provides a check for firms to improve their purchasing terms
• Labor must be considered as a supplier. Unions and scarce, highly skilled labor can bargain away potential profits
Memphis, TN, United States