Tuesday, November 24, 2009

My Comments on Bloomberg TV Interview with Apple Analyst

Broadpoint AmTech analyst Brian Marshall recently appeared on Bloomberg TV to discuss Apple’s iPhone exclusivity agreement with AT&T. Marshall believes that Apple should move away from its exclusive AT&T agreement and begin offering the iPhone through Verizon. He believes adding Verizon could boost iPhone unit sales by 14M. Marshall states that AT&T’s exclusivity ends in June 2010, and explains why Apple would benefit by offering the iPhone through Verizon. Fortune’s Apple 2.0 and Silicon Alley Insider summarized several of Marshall’s points, which I believe aren’t entirely accurate.

Here is a video of the Bloomberg TV Interview



1) Apple receives a $450 subsidy.

Incorrect: Apple receives a $400 subsidy.

I know from talks with Best Buy managers that the subsidy is $400. Best Buy purchases a 16GB iPhone from Apple for $542, and sells it for $199 with a 24 month service contract. AT&T reimburses Best Buy $400.

A 16GB iPhone without a contract commitment costs $599. If the subsidy were $450, then that price should be $650, or AT&T would be leaving $50 on the table. In addition, the math suggests $450 subsidy is too high given the ASPs implied by the cash value of iPhones sold reported by Apple.

2) After AT&T loses exclusivity that subsidy will drop to $300 for all carriers, domestic and international.

Incorrect: Subsidy shouldn’t change.

Tim cook addressed this issue on Apples Q4 2009 conference call (from Seeking Alpha):
Gene Munster – Piper Jaffray
We’re looking at the iPhone, it’s pretty clear we’re still in a greenfield opportunity here, but if you start to go to multiple carriers can you talk a little bit about the pricing of the phone when you go from exclusivity to multiple carriers? And obviously, not specific but any sort of color we can have in terms of pricing dynamics change on the phone from you to the carrier?
Timothy D. Cook
Our pricing is confidential, Gene, so it’s not something I could comment on in detail but generally speaking from markets where we’re already selling I would not expect to see a wholesale price difference as we bring on other carriers. However, the end user price is really set by the carriers themselves so you may or may not see a street price difference.
Gene Munster – Piper Jaffray
So when you go from exclusive to multiple carriers, you wouldn’t necessarily see change in pricing that you are charging the carrier? Is that correct?
Timothy D. Cook
That’s correct.
Handset subsidies are a function of ARPU, or a subscriber’s monthly service bill. The ARPU across all AT&T customers is ~$51 compared to iPhone ARPU of nearly $100. Since the ARPU is nearly double, this allows a greater degree of subsidy recapture, thus allowing for a higher subsidy to applied to a mobile device.

3) iPhone users represent 4% of total AT&T subscribers.

Incorrect: iPhone users represent about 14% of AT&T’s total wireless customer base.

AT&T has roughly 11.3M iPhone users. On the June call, AT&T said it had nearly 9M iPhone customers. AT&T has 81.6M wireless subs, with 63.4M being postpaid.



Screen+shot+2009-11-24+at+12.31.50+PM.png


Brian Marshall stated: “roughly 4% of the AT&T users of the iPhone, consume about 40% of the overall network bandwidth.”

It’s not clear exactly what Marshall was referring to when he mentioned 4%, but most people took it to mean iPhone users constitute 4% of AT&T’s customer base. I assume he got his figures mixed up. The 3.2M iPhone activations in September period would equate to 4% of AT&T’s subscriber base. If he meant 4% of iPhone users, or about 450K, consumer 40% of AT&T’s bandwidth, then I would think AT&T would address those users since they represent 0.6% of AT&T’s wireless subscriber base. It wouldn’t make any sense to allow such a miniscule portion of customers affect the quality of service of the overall network.

4) iPhone activations from new AT&T customers made up more than  90% of postpaid net additions in September quarter.

Not Meaningful: Gross additions not net additions should be used as the metric.

iPhone activations from new AT&T customers totaled approx. 1.28M.  AT&T reported 1.39 postpaid net additions. However, AT&T attracted 3.57M new postpaid customers, and 2.18M postpaid customers left AT&T, resulting in 1.39 net additions.

Comparing iPhone activations from new AT&T customers versus net additions is a faulty metric, since net additions is dependent on gross additions and the number of disconnects (churn). The more meaningful metric is comparing new iPhone additions to postpaid gross additions, which was 36% (1.28M / 3.57M). Using net additions is meaningless.

To imply that the iPhone was responsible for 92% of AT&T’s increase in postpaid customers is inaccurate. The 1.28M figure represents a portion of AT&T’s gross sub additions, therefore, it shouldn’t be used in a comparison of net additions. Subscriber churn affects subscriber net additions, and isn’t directly related to the iPhone’s ability to attract new customers.


Screen+shot+2009-11-24+at+12.32.03+PM.png

Let’s say AT&T activated 2.28M Blackberry devices from new AT&T customers. That would equate to 165% of postpaid net adds, whereas iPhone was 92% of postpaid net adds. Is that meaningful? Not really, since it’s possible that the figure can exceed 100%. Let’s say 2.28M iPhone activations were from new customers, then that 92% would be 165%. Since the ceiling can exceed 100%, we don’t know is 92% or 165% or whatever the figure, is good or bad.

5) AT&T’s contract ends in June 2010.

Unknown: I have heard from sources at AT&T the contract runs until the end of 2010.

Neither AT&T nor Apple has publicly commented as to when the exclusivity ends. It was reported last year that Apple and AT&T extended their agreement until the end of 2010. It would make sense that the agreement runs until the end of the year since it commenced in the beginning of 2007. Even though the iPhone didn’t go on sale until June 2007, it was announced that January, allowing AT&T marketing rights for the time preceding the actual product launch.

Many assume that the deal will end mid-2010 since Apple introduces new iPhone models during that time of year. However, all we know is that the exclusivity agreement will end at some future time, but when that is exactly is anyone’s guess.

Disclosure: Long AAPL

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Apple Inc (AAPL): Weaker Dollar Will Benefit Revenue Growth and Margins

Apple Inc. (nasd:AAPL) Rising gross margins stemming from increased recognition of deferred iPhone revenue has been a key factor in propelling Apple’s share price and EPS. I believe the next major tailwind will be increased revenue growth and higher margins arising from the falling U.S. Dollar. In 2009, 46% of Apple’s total revenue came from overseas, up from 43% in FY08 and 41% in FY07. Including European Apple retail stores, revenue generated in Europe was roughly 30% of total revenue in FY09. International markets are a key source of Apple’s revenue and growth, and a declining dollar is beneficial for the firm. Apple’s performance for the past several quarters was challenged by headwinds from the strengthening USD. Going forward, Apple should benefit from the dollar’s decline. This will lift international revenue growth and boost margins. Alternatively, Apple could choose to lower prices abroad to stimulate product demand to drive volume. I believe many investors overlook the fact that Apple derives nearly half its revenue outside the U.S., thus don’t consider the considerable impact coming from a weaker USD.

The USD had been on a long-term weakening trend up until late 2008 when a string of financial institutions collapsed and panic ensued. This led to a massive influx into U.S. Treasuries, hence the USD. This caused a temporary rise in the USD as investors all over the world sought refuge in securities perceived to be the safest.









Around April/May 2009, money began shifting out of USD leading to the currency weakening. In effect, USD depreciation is a resumption of its previous long-term trend. However, this recent fall in the dollar comes with several new factors that support a long-term dollar decline.

1) Massive stimulus and bailouts
2) Budget deficits
3) Diversification away from USD
4) Weak dollar policy to boost exports and domestic manufacturing

I expect the dollar to continue it’s weakening trend and a return to levels pre-fall 2008. From October to about May, the USD rose considerably, before starting its slide mid-year. Apple generally hedges against currency fluctuations usually 3 to 6 months out, therefore the rise in the USD late-2008 likely didn’t much of an immediate impact. Eventually, the effect of the stronger dollar is felt as new hedges are set at less favorable exchange rates. Apple had warned on its earnings calls that a stronger USD would negatively impact gross margins, thus stated it a as factor for guiding GM lower. However, cheaper components, higher iPhone revenue recognition, increased supply chain efficiencies, and foreign currency hedging more than offset the temporary rise in the USD.  Apple mentioned in its 2009 10-K filing that the stronger USD did have a negative impact on revenue growth abroad for the full year. When hedges expire, Apple can either raise prices to offset the stronger USD or elect to accept lower ASPs in USD terms. Even though the USD began to fall back in April/May, it’s likely Apple has yet to feel the full benefit of the dollar’s decline due to currency hedges still in effect. 


The tables below compare product pricing from Apple’s online store for France, U.K., Canada, Australia, and Japan at most recent exchange rates versus rates in early 2009 when the USD was at its highs. Some of the pricing includes VAT, so the price differential between U.S. product prices and Euro zone is overstated, but the focus here is the difference between most recent prices (weak dollar) versus prices when the dollar was stronger during late 2008 - early 2009. In Europe, where Apple receives nearly 30% of its total revenues, prices have risen more that 20% in USD terms. In general, that would equate to a 6% increase in overall ASPs.





A weaker dollar does imply higher product costs since Apple sources components and manufacturing outside the U.S., namely Asia. However, the negative impact of a weaker dollar in terms of product costs is much less than the benefit of higher ASPs in USD terms. This is because: 1) costs are a smaller percentage of overall selling price 2) Apple enters into long-term supply agreements and also has significant leverage over suppliers 3) China’s currency is fixed to the USD as it prefers a weak currency to support exports.

In summary, Apple faced currency headwinds for much of FY09 which I expect will turn into tailwinds for FY10. This factor hasn’t been mentioned much in the investment community. A weak dollar will boost ASPs (in USD terms), hence international revenue growth as well as lift gross margins. Apple could also choose to take advantage of the weakening dollar by cutting prices where it sees elastic demand. Therefore, I expect GM will continue to show strength aiding in the growth of Apple’s bottom line.

Disclosure: Long AAPL.

Memphis, TN, United States